A 2016 Copa America Bump for Major League Soccer? Strengthening the Case for Legal Action Arising from the Corrupted 2022 World Cup Bid by Todd, Jeff & Jewell, R. Todd
William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 3 Article 4
A 2016 Copa America Bump for Major League
Soccer? Strengthening the Case for Legal Action
Arising from the Corrupted 2022 World Cup Bid
Jeff Todd
R. Todd Jewell
Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Repository Citation
Jeff Todd and R. Todd Jewell, A 2016 Copa America Bump for Major League Soccer? Strengthening the
Case for Legal Action Arising from the Corrupted 2022 World Cup Bid, 9 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 619
(2018), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol9/iss3/4
 619 
A 2016 COPA AMERICA BUMP FOR MAJOR 
LEAGUE SOCCER? STRENGTHENING THE CASE 
FOR LEGAL ACTION ARISING FROM THE 
CORRUPTED 2022 WORLD CUP BID 
JEFF TODD* 
R. TODD JEWELL** 
ABSTRACT 
Governmental and private investigations have generated 
evidence of corruption in the bidding process to host the 2022 FIFA 
World Cup, which went to Qatar rather than the United States. 
One economic study has shown an increase in professional soccer 
attendance in European countries that host the World Cup and the 
European Championships. Accordingly, Major League Soccer and 
its investor-operators could pursue tort and unfair competition 
claims to argue that denial of a 2022 World Cup USA will result 
in lowered attendance, and thus lost profits and diminished busi-
ness value. Key differences in American and European soccer leagues 
and sports markets might render the assumption that MLS would 
see a World Cup bump in attendance dubious, however, thus pre-
cluding a successful action for damages. The United States recently 
hosted the 2016 Copa America, a regional soccer tournament sim-
ilar to the European Championship. An ordinary least squares re-
gression analysis of MLS attendance data immediately before and 
after the Copa America reveals an increase in attendance correlated 
with the tournament, thus supporting application of the World 
Cup bump in a legal action for money damages related to the cor-
rupted 2022 World Cup bid. This Article suggests the need for fur-
ther research in economics about the impact of nations hosting major 
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soccer tournaments and in evidence law about applying economic 
studies from one product, business, or market to another product, 
business, or market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 
in 2009 solicited bids from national soccer associations for rights 
to host the 2022 edition of the biggest sporting event on the planet: 
the World Cup.1 With financial and logistical support from Major 
League Soccer (MLS),2 the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) 
had the strongest bid based upon existing stadiums and infrastruc-
ture as well as U.S. experience hosting sporting mega-events.3 The 
USSF nevertheless lost to the Qatar Football Association (QFA) de-
spite Qatar’s numerous problems ranging from a lack of stadiums 
to dangerously hot playing conditions.4 In light of the reputation of 
FIFA’s Executive Committee (ExCo) for corruption,5 commentators 
speculated that bribery had sent the World Cup to Qatar.6 
                                                                                                            
1 Letter from Jérôme Valcke, Secretary General, FIFA, to Member Associations 
of FIFA Eligible to Bid for the 2018 and/or 2022 FIFA World Cup (Jan. 15, 2009), 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/99/74/80/20182022 
invitationtobidcirculare.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6KN-QSC2]; see Daniel Gandert & 
Harry Epstein, The Court’s Yellow Card for the United States Soccer Federation: 
A Case for Implied Antitrust Immunity, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 5 (2011) (char-
acterizing the FIFA World Cup as “the largest sporting event in the world”). 
2 See USA Bid Receives $2 Million Dollar Donation from MLS Club Owners 
and Soccer United Marketing, U.S. SOCCER (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.ussoccer 
.com/stories/2014/03/17/11/23/usa-bid-receives-two-million-dollar-donation-from 
-mls-club-owners-and-sum [https://perma.cc/2CQH-TNHJ] [hereinafter USA 
Bid Receives]. 
3 See Jeff Todd & R. Todd Jewell, Reclaiming Economic Legacy: One Legal 
Strategy for a 2022 FIFA World Cup USA, 44 CAP. U.L. REV. 245, 254 (2016) 
[hereinafter Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming]. 
4 Jeff Todd & R. Todd Jewell, Major League Soccer and the Corrupted 2022 
FIFA World Cup Bidding: Proving Harm and Recovering Damages, 41 VT. L. 
REV. 23, 33–34 (2016) [hereinafter Todd & Jewell, MLS]; see also Kate Youd, 
Comment, The Winter’s Tale of Corruption: The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, 
the Impending Shift to Winter, and Potential Legal Actions Against FIFA, 35 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167, 171 (2014). 
5 E.g., Ali Eghbal, Note, Enough Is Enough: FIFA Must Incorporate Principles 
from the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 to Combat Ongoing Executive 
Committee Corruption, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 385, 387–88 (2016) (characterizing FIFA 
corruption as “the norm, not the exception” and noting that accusations against 
the Executive Committee date back to the 1980s); Guillermo Jorge, Fixing FIFA: 
The Experience of the Independent Governance Committee, 21 SW. J. INT’L L. 
165, 167 (2014) (calling the ExCo “the setting for extensive logrolling, favor 
exchanges, and power-broking among global, regional, and local players”). 
6 E.g., Travis L. Marmara, Note, Free Kick: FIFA’s Unintended Role in Illu-
minating Jurisdictional Gaps of International Criminal Courts, 41 BROOK. J. 
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Ongoing governmental investigations and evidence from 
FIFA itself are confirming that speculation.7 FIFA is a Swiss non-
profit corporation,8 and the Swiss Office of the Attorney General 
(OAG) has launched an investigation into corruption in the 2018 
and 2022 World Cup bidding processes.9 The Swiss OAG has pro-
cured computer records from FIFA and frozen the bank accounts 
of several FIFA executives.10 The Swiss have assisted the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ), which has indicted forty-one individ-
uals and corporations, and is actively investigating twenty-four 
unindicted co-conspirators, including persons associated with World 
Cup bidding and with the QFA.11 Several persons have pled guilty, 
given testimony, and agreed to $190,000,000 in forfeiture.12 FIFA 
has cooperated with the Swiss investigations,13 and in the U.S. 
prosecutions, it has submitted a claim for restitution as a victim.14 
FIFA internal investigations and disciplinary proceedings have led 
to public acknowledgement of corruption by many of the ExCo 
members who voted on the 2022 World Cup, including findings that 
Mohamad Bin Hammam, a Qatari billionaire with links to the QFA, 
acted specifically to influence the vote for his home country.15 
                                                                                                            
INT’L L. 1393, 1396, 1412–13 (2016); Samuel Morris, Comment, FIFA World Cup 
2022: Why the United States Cannot Successfully Challenge FIFA Awarding the 
Cup to Qatar and How the Qatar Controversy Shows FIFA Need Large-Scale 
Changes, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 541, 549–53 (2012). 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 8–15. 
8 Bruce W. Bean, An Interim Essay on FIFA’s World Cup of Corruption: The 
Desperate Need for International Corporate Governance Standards at FIFA, 22 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 367, 370 (2016). 
9 Marmara, supra note 6, at 1396; The Office of the Attorney General of Swit-
zerland seizes documents at FIFA, FED. COUNCIL (May 27, 2015), https://www 
.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-57391.html [https:// 
perma.cc/9S3L-L4CC] [hereinafter OAG Seizes]. 
10 U.S. Department of Justice Charges Leaders of FIFA, Affiliate Soccer Or-
ganizations, and Sports Marketing Companies in 47-Count Indictment, 109 
AM. J. INT’L L. 672, 675–76 (Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson 
eds., 2015) [hereinafter DOJ Charges Leaders]. 
11 Bean, supra note 8, at 367–69, 375. 
12 Id. at 369; Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, at 260. 
13 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 50. 
14 Fédération Internationale de Football Association’s Victim Statement 
and Request for Restitution, United States v. Hawit, No. 15-CR-252 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 16, 2016); Rebecca R. Ruiz, Seeking Millions, FIFA Has Bigger Aim, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2016, at B9, B11. 
15 See, e.g., Michael J. Garcia & Cornel Borbély, Report on the Inquiry into 
the 2018/2022 World CupTM Bidding Process, FIFA ETHICS COMMITTEE 240–49, 
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This mounting evidence of corruption opens some legal av-
enues of redress for MLS.16 For example, MLS could seek money 
damages by asserting tortious interference with prospective economic 
advantage against individuals like Bin Hammam.17 Assuming 
sufficient evidence that persons affiliated with the QFA partici-
pated in the scheme, FIFA rules also permit leagues to pursue arbi-
tration against soccer officials under Swiss law,18 and MLS could 
recover under the Swiss Federal Act on Unfair Competition 
(FAUC).19 Entities related to MLS might also have claims, such 
as the MLS investors who have management agreements to operate 
individual teams (investor-operators) in exchange for a percent-
age of ticket sales and concessions.20 All options require the claim-
ants to show that the USSF losing the right to host the World Cup 
                                                                                                            
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89 
/87/97/aus_bel-ned_eng_esp-por_jpn_kor_qat_report_neutral.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/NJD6-H4E9] (describing FIFA’s findings with regard to various allegations 
of impropriety surrounding the Qatari bid); see FIFA Executive Committee 2010: 
Where are they now?, RTE SPORT (Dec. 1, 2015, 4:57 PM), https://www.rte.ie 
/sport/soccer/2015/1201/750480-fifas-executive-committee-where-are-they-now/ 
[https://perma.cc/F2LR-2H46] (reporting on the indictments, investigations, sus-
pensions, and bans of the 2010 ExCo members); David Conn, Thailand FA presi-
dent Worawi Makudi gets 90-day football suspension, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015, 
4:16 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/oct/12/fifa-worawi-makudi 
-thailand-suspended-90-days [https://perma.cc/KWT7-MF36] (reporting that 
FIFA suspended or banned nine voters for the 2022 World Cup and that two 
more “resigned before being exposed for having taken bribes”); see also HEIDI BLAKE 
& JONATHAN CALVERT, THE UGLY GAME: THE CORRUPTION OF FIFA AND THE QATARI 
PLOT TO BUY THE WORLD CUP 3 (2015) (characterizing Bin Hammam as the 
architect of the corrupt scheme to buy the 2022 World Cup for Qatar). 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 17–24. 
17 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, passim. 
18 FIFA STATUTES arts. 66–68 (2015) (requiring persons, teams, and leagues 
within FIFA to submit to arbitration in the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which 
shall apply FIFA regulations as well as Swiss law). 
19 BUNDESGESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB [UWG] [SWISS FED. 
ACT ON UNFAIR COMPETITION] Dec. 19, 1986, SR 241, arts. 4a, 9–10 (Switz.) 
[hereinafter SWISS FED. ACT ON UNFAIR COMPETITION] (permitting monetary 
and equitable relief for persons whose economic interests are harmed by acts 
of unfair competition). 
20 Tim Bezbatchenko, Comment, Bend it for Beckham: A Look at Major League 
Soccer and its Single Entity Defense to Antitrust Liability After the Designated 
Player Role, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 611, 624–25 (2008); Tyler A. Coppage, Comment, 
Taking the Training Wheels Off MLS: Why the Single Entity Antitrust Exemp-
tion Should No Longer Apply, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 545, 558 (2015); Remo 
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somehow damaged them.21 Two sports economists, Bastien Drut 
and Stefan Szymanski, have done research that seems to make 
such a showing possible.22 Examining data about attendance at 
professional soccer games in nations that host international soccer 
tournaments like the World Cup, they concluded that the tier-one 
leagues of those nations see a significant bump in attendance in 
the year of the tournament and in subsequent seasons.23 Applied 
to MLS and using the most conservative assumptions, a World 
Cup bump would have generated an additional $294 million in 
attendance revenues for the 2022 through 2026 seasons and a 
$261 million increase in business value.24 
Whether the Drut and Szymanski findings apply to MLS is 
an open question.25 Most of their data are for the English Premier 
League (EPL), Germany’s Bundesliga, France’s Ligue 1, and Italy’s 
Serie A,26 four well-established leagues from countries where soc-
cer is the top sport and clubs have the world’s top talent.27 By 
contrast, the two-decade-old MLS competes with four other U.S. 
professional team sports and has its talent limited by a single-
entity structure where the league owns all teams and restricts 
player salaries.28 The assumption that the fledgling MLS will see 
                                                                                                            
Decurtins, Major League Soccer’s Exceptionalism in FIFA’s Transfer System: 
For How Much Longer?, 27 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 333 (2017); Matthew J. 
Jakobsze, Comment, Kicking “Single-Entity” to the Sidelines: Reevaluating the 
Competitive Reality of Major League Soccer After American Needle and the 
2010 Collective Bargaining Agreement, 31 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 131, 147–48 (2010). 
21 See, e.g., Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72, 73 (1943) 
(noting that “the causing of harm is predominantly the basis of tort actions.”). 
22 See generally Bastien Drut & Stefan Szymanski, The Private Benefit of 
Public Funding: The FIFA World Cup, UEFA European Championship and 
Attendance at Host Country League Football (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with the University of Michigan Department of Kinesiology), 
http://www.soccernomics-agency.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/04 
/The-private-benefit-of-public-funding.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CXA-5KMW]. 
23 See infra Section II.A. 
24 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 40–43. 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 26–29. 
26 See Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 4–5, 13. The one non-European 
tournament that they measured was the 2002 World Cup, which was co-hosted 
by Japan and Korea. Id. 
27 See Bean, supra note 8, at 372–73. 
28 See Diana C. Taylor, Aimed at the Goal?: The Sustainability of Major League 
Soccer’s Structure, 9 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, passim (2011) (comparing and 
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a similar World Cup bump to Europe’s top leagues may not be 
reasonable enough to support an economic model of MLS’s lost 
attendance and related damages.29 
The Drut and Szymanski article suggests a means to gauge 
the vitality of its applicability to MLS, however: in addition to the 
World Cup, they studied attendance related to the UEFA Euro-
pean Championships (the Euro Cup), a tournament limited to the 
top national teams from European countries.30 In 2016, the United 
States hosted the Copa America Centenario, a regional tourna-
ment similar to the Euro Cup but comprised of sixteen of the best 
national teams from North, Central, and South America and the Ca-
ribbean.31 If MLS were to see an increase in attendance associated 
with the Copa America—especially if that increase were compa-
rable to that observed by Drut and Szymanski for European 
                                                                                                            
contrasting MLS with European leagues and with other U.S. professional 
sports leagues); see Bezbatchenko, supra note 20, at 635 (writing that “MLS 
competes with the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL in today’s saturated sports mar-
ket”); Decurtins, supra note 20, at 345–48 (contrasting the transfer and salary 
rules of European leagues with MLS); Mark W. Lenihan, Comment, Major 
League Soccer Scores an Own Goal: A Successful Joint Venture Attains Market 
Power in an International Sport, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 881, 899 (2013) (noting 
questions about MLS quality related to salary structure). 
29 See, e.g., John W. Hill et al., Increasing Complexity and Partisanship in 
Business Damages Expert Testimony: The Need for a Modified Trial Regime in 
Quantification of Damages, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 297, 311 (2009) (writing that courts 
exclude economics expert testimony based upon damages models that make 
unrealistic and unfounded comparisons); Robert M. Lloyd, Proving Lost Profits 
after Daubert: Five Questions Every Court Should Ask Before Admitting Expert 
Testimony, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 379, 399–400 (2007) (same); Jeff Todd & R. Todd 
Jewell, Dubious Assumptions, Economic Models, and Expert Testimony, 42 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 1 (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Todd & Jewell, Dubious] (same). 
30 Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 1–5 (France hosted twenty-four na-
tional teams in the most recent tournament in June and July, 2016); see UEFA 
EURO 2016: France, UEFA (last visited Apr. 3, 2018), http://www.uefa.com 
/uefaeuro/about-euro/index.html [https://perma.cc/2T8Q-D2CU]. 
31 See Sam Stejskal, Copa America, MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER (June 2, 2016, 11:40 
AM), http://www.mlssoccer.com/meta/competition/copa-america/centenario-101 
[https://perma.cc/VFP5-QFR8] (providing details about the tournament); Chris 
Smith, The Secret Success Story of the Copa America, FORBES (June 30, 2016, 
11:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2016/06/30/the-secret-suc 
cess-story-of-the-copa-america/#ade6de045e75 [https://perma.cc/2QFE-QT9Q] 
(reporting that 1.5 million fans attended matches while television broadcasts 
reached another 1.5 billion homes). 
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leagues—then that Copa America bump would support a claim 
for damages for loss of the 2022 World Cup USA.32 
This Article tests the assumption that MLS would have a 
World Cup bump by performing a regression analysis of atten-
dance data for MLS clubs before and after the 2016 Copa America 
Centenario. Part I provides background information on MLS, cor-
ruption in the 2022 World Cup bid, and the ensuing governmental 
and private investigations. Part II turns to the economic impact 
on professional soccer leagues of hosting a World Cup by summa-
rizing the Drut and Szymanski study and applying their findings 
to potential legal actions by MLS or its investor-operators. Part 
III then cites legal and economic sources to explain why tribunals 
exclude economic models based upon problematic assumptions, in 
particular, assumptions that inapt products and markets are sim-
ilar. Part IV explicates key differences between the European and 
American sports markets and soccer products to show why the World 
Cup bump might not apply to MLS. Part V contains the authors’ own 
economic model, a regression analysis of MLS attendance data before 
and after the 2016 Copa America Centenario, and concludes that 
MLS saw an increase in attendance of more than 900 fans per game 
in games played just prior to or after the Copa America, giving evi-
dence of a Copa America bump. The Article concludes with impli-
cations for MLS, applicability beyond MLS, and recommendations for 
future research in both law and economics. 
I. INTERNATIONAL SOCCER AND WORLD CUP CORRUPTION 
FIFA is the worldwide governing body of soccer.33 Its mem-
bers are 211 national associations that oversee amateur and pro-
fessional soccer within their respective countries.34 These national 
associations are also grouped into six regional confederations: 
The Confederation of North, Central America, and Caribbean As-
sociation Football (CONCACAF); Confederación Sudamericana de 
Fútbal (CONMEBOL); Union des Associations Européennes de 
                                                                                                            
32 See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Law and the Art of Modeling: Are Models 
Facts?, 103 GEO. L.J. 825, 830 (2015) (writing that “the authority of a model is 
derived from its exposure to a process of critical review”). 
33 DOJ Charges Leaders, supra note 10, at 673. 
34 Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, at 249–51; Associations, FIFA, 
http://www.fifa.com/associations/ [https://perma.cc/HLQ6-H8MT]. 
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Football (UEFA); Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF); Asian 
Football Confederation (AFC); and Oceania Football Confederation 
(OFC).35 By contract with FIFA and by U.S. federal law, the USSF 
is the national association for the United States and is part of 
CONCACAF.36 One right of FIFA membership is the ability to 
host the “largest sporting event in the world,”37 the quadrennial 
FIFA World Cup, which the USSF did in 1994.38 
The 1994 World Cup marked a global debut of sorts for U.S. 
soccer.39 On the field, the U.S. Men’s National Team (USMNT) 
advanced from the group stage in front of the home crowd—and 
has done so three more times in subsequent tournaments.40 Off 
the field, the United States set and still holds the attendance rec-
ord for a World Cup, even with subsequent tournaments in tradi-
tional soccer nations like Germany and Brazil.41 Perhaps the most 
notable event was the birth of MLS.42 As consideration for award-
ing the 1994 World Cup, FIFA required the USSF to establish a 
tier-one professional league.43 Ten teams opened MLS play in 
                                                                                                            
35 Associations, supra note 34. 
36 ChampionsWorld LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529); Associations, supra note 
34; FIFA, STANDARD COOPERATION AGREEMENT arts. 3, 5, http://www.fifa.com 
/mm/document/affederation/administration/75/81/23/standard_cooperation_agree 
ment_efsd_47345.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL4Q-XXHD]; see Gandert & Epstein, 
supra note 1, at 3–8 (describing the structure of FIFA, the place of the USSF 
within it, and the Ted Stevens Amateur and Olympic Sports Act). 
37 Gandert & Epstein, supra note 1, at 5 (opining that FIFA “could be de-
scribed as the most powerful IF [International Federation], with the FIFA World 
Cup being the largest sporting event in the world”). 
38 History: Timeline, USSOCCER, http://www.ussoccer.com/about/history/time 
line [https://perma.cc/5LVJ-2BL4]. 
39 Michael Lewis, How USA was chosen to host World Cup 94: the inside story of 
a historic day, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/football/2015/jul/04/usa-world-cup-94-inside-story [https://perma.cc/D2NX-G29N]. 
40 Ryan Rosenblatt, United States World Cup history: What’s the farthest the 
USMNT have progressed?, SB NATION (July 1, 2014, 12:41 PM), http://www.sb 
nation.com/soccer/2014/7/1/5861212/usa-belgium-2014-world-cup-history [https:// 
perma.cc/2GX3-DSBQ]. 
41 FIFA World Cup All Time Statistics, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/fifa-tour 
naments/statistics-and-records/worldcup/ [https://perma.cc/SA5M-X7DL] (listing 
the 1994 World Cup USA average attendance as 68,991, 2006 World Cup Germany 
as 52,491, and 2014 World Cup Brazil as 52,918). 
42 History: Timeline, supra note 38. 
43 Taylor, supra note 28, at 2. 
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1996.44 Despite limited television exposure compared to the big four 
U.S. professional sports leagues, the National Football League 
(NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball Asso-
ciation (NBA), and National Hockey League (NHL),45 MLS has done 
well in its short existence: the number of teams has more than dou-
bled to 22,46 expansion fees have increased from $5 million to $110 
million,47 and per-game attendance has increased to an average 
higher than the NHL or NBA.48 
With increasing interest by U.S. fans in World Cup soccer, 
the tens of thousands of spectators at each World Cup match, and 
a global media reach of 3 billion people,49 another World Cup in 
the United States would fulfill MLS Commissioner Don Garber’s 
                                                                                                            
44 See, e.g., Gandert & Epstein, supra note 1, at 35 (“MLS is a creation of 
the USSF. MLS was created as part of a promise from USSF to FIFA that a 
professional soccer league would be started in exchange for being able to host 
the 1994 FIFA World Cup.”); History: Timeline, supra note 38 (presenting a 
detailed timeline of MLS’s formation and seminal events). 
45 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 43–44. 
46 History: Timeline, supra note 38; MLS Teams, YAHOO! SPORTS, http://sports 
.yahoo.com/soccer/mls/teams/ [https://perma.cc/ZP6L-5U66]. 
47 Christopher Savino, Franchise Fees in MLS Increasing at a Rate of 18% 
Since Inaugural Season, BUSINESS OF $OCCER (2012), http://www.businessofsoc 
cer.com/2013/06/11/franchise-fees-in-mls-increasing-at-a-rate-of-18-since-inaugu 
ral-season/ [https://perma.cc/D936-KHEN]; Kevin Baxter, Expansion L.A. soc-
cer team plans new stadium on Sports Arena site, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2015, 
6:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-la-soccer-stadium-20150 
518-story.html [https://perma.cc/44EN-LL99]. 
48 Fred Dreier, MLS passes NBA as third best-attended American sport, 
SPORTING NEWS (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.sportingnews.com/soccer-news/205972 
-mls-passes-nba-as-third-best-attended-american-sport [https://perma.cc/5X6M 
-PCD4]. 
49 FIFA World Cup group stages break new ground in TV viewing, FIFA 
(June 28, 2014), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2014/m=6/news=fifa-world 
-cuptm-group-stages-break-new-ground-in-tv-viewing-2388418.html [https:// 
perma.cc/BRC2-5P58]; World Cup final sets U.S. TV record, ESPNFC (July 15, 
2014), http://www.espnfc.us/fifa-world-cup/story/1950567/world-cup-final-most 
-watched-soccer-game-in-us-history-more-than-26-million-viewers [https://perma 
.cc/58LS-RQ9C] (describing the exceeded expectations of television viewership 
2014 World Cup final); Warren S. Grimes, The FIFA World Cup and Dysfunc-
tional Television Distribution in the United States, 21 SW. J. INT’L L. 155, 155 
(2014) (finding that the 2014 World Cup U.S.-Belgium match drew 21.6 million 
U.S. viewers and the final between Germany and Argentina drew 26.5 million 
U.S. viewers). 
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goal of the United States “becoming a soccer nation.”50 Accordingly, 
when FIFA solicited associations to bid for hosting rights to the 
2018 and 2022 World Cups,51 the USSF registered a bid for 2022 
along with other non-European associations: Australia, Japan, 
Korea, and Qatar.52 USSF and MLS work together on national 
team issues,53 so MLS played an important role in the bid.54 Part 
of its support was logistical, such as providing office space in its 
New York headquarters and having Commissioner Garber serve 
as a member of the bid committee.55 Part of this support was fi-
nancial, with MLS and its marketing arm contributing $2 million 
to the bid committee.56 Under FIFA rules in effect in 2010, the 
ExCo had sole power to select the winning bid.57 Twenty-two ExCo 
members voted by secret ballots in rounds, and the association 
with the lowest vote tally in each round was eliminated until one 
achieved a majority.58 Though the USSF survived to the final 
round, the QFA prevailed with fourteen votes versus eight.59 
All objective criteria pointed to the USSF as having the 
stronger bid.60 The United States has dozens of large modern sta-
diums, mild summers throughout most of the country, and expe-
rience hosting mega sporting events like the 1994 World Cup and 
                                                                                                            
50 Major League Soccer attendance is up, but TV ratings lag as U.S. Soccer 
mulls future, USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2017, 8:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com 
/story/sports/mls/2017/11/17/mls-attendance-up-tv-ratings-lag-as-us-mulls-fu 
ture/107770250/ [https://perma.cc/WS8G-YG64]. 
51 Letter from Jérôme Valcke, supra note 1; USA Bid Committee to Focus on 
2022 FIFA World Cup, USSOCCER.COM (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.ussoccer.com/sto 
ries/2014/03/17/13/52/usa-bid-committee-to-focus-on-2022-fifa-world-cup [https:// 
perma.cc/A5XP-53Q5] [hereinafter USA Bid Committee]. 
52 USA Bid Committee, supra note 51 (announcing USA Bid Committee’s deci-
sion to withdraw its 2018 FIFA World Cup bid to “focus on the 2022 campaign”). 
53 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 53 (claiming that “MLS and the 
USSF collaborate on national team issues”). 
54 USA Bid Receives, supra note 2. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Morris, supra note 6, at 547; see Garcia & Borbély, supra note 15, at 8–36 
(summarizing the FIFA rules in effect in 2009–2010 as well as the bidding process). 
58 Frank Keogh, The World Cup in their hands: Who are the FIFA 22?, BBC 
SPORT (Dec. 2, 2010, 3:23 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/9101371 
.stm [https://perma.cc/U3RC-9LPT]. 
59 Garcia & Borbély, supra note 15, at 34–36; Morris, supra note 6, at 548–49. 
60 Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, at 254. 
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1996 Olympics.61 By contrast, Qatar lacks world-class stadiums 
and major tournament hosting experience, not to mention having 
dangerously hot 120-degree summers and posing a security risk.62 
Qatar does not lack resources, however: it is the richest country 
per capita, and with the backing of the emirate, the QFA Bid 
Committee outspent the USSF bid committee by four-to-one.63 
Some witnesses and documents illustrate that the QFA paid 
ExCo members for their votes.64 For example, Phaedra Almajid, 
a former employee of the Qatar bid committee, claimed to be pres-
ent when committee members made payments to three African 
ExCo members; she later withdrew the allegation, but only under 
threat of lawsuit by a Qatar bid committee member.65 The QFA 
has repeatedly and vociferously denied that its bid committee en-
gaged in illicit conduct.66 What cannot be denied is that many of 
                                                                                                            
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 254–55; see Eghbal, supra note 5, at 391 (writing that FIFA ignored 
its own assessment of the health risk and a security briefing that Qatar pre-
sented a high risk of a terrorist attack). 
63 See Caitlin Murray, Is the US ready—or even willing—to host the 2026 
World Cup?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com 
/football/blog/2015/aug/10/is-the-us-ready-or-even-willing-to-host-the-2026-world 
-cup [https://perma.cc/CT6C-3K6Y] (estimating that the QFA spent $42 million 
on its bid activities). 
64 See, e.g., Amadou Diakite appeals FIFA ban, ESPN (May 10, 2011, 3:18 
PM),http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/news/_/id/6521474/suspended-fifa-official 
-amadou-diakite-appeals-ban-cas [https://perma.cc/RUY6-KT93] (reporting that 
ExCo member Diakite told undercover reporters that Qatar bid committee 
members offered $1 million in bribes to African ExCo members). 
65 See BLAKE & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 119–20; Joshua D. Winneker, 
It’s Time to Blow the Whistle on Performance Enhancing Drugs, 20 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 55, 81 (2016); Mark Hosenball, FBI probe includes 2018, 2022 
World Cup host awards: U.S. official, REUTERS (June 3, 2015, 2:38 PM), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fifa-fbi-idUSKBN0OJ26X20150603 [https:// 
perma.cc/6B2S-VP4E]. But see Garcia & Borbély, supra note 15, at 249–72 
(documenting reasons why Almajid’s accounts are not credible). 
66 See, e.g., Hamad bin Khalifa bin Ahmad Al Thani, Qatar had the strongest 
bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Here’s why, GUARDIAN (June 20, 2014, 9:59 
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/20/why-qatar-had 
-strongest-bid-for-2022-fifa-world-cup [https://perma.cc/CZC9-MVAS]; Qatar 
FA hits back at English football chief Dyke, DAILY MAIL (June 3, 2015, 10:11 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3108896/Qatar-hits-English 
-football-chief-Dyke.html (quoting statement from Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa 
bin Ahmad Al-Thani welcoming the Swiss investigations and noting that a 
prior internal investigation cleared the organization of “any wrongdoing”); Qatar 
 
632 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:619 
the ExCo members in 2010 were corrupt: half have been sus-
pended or banned by FIFA, resigned voluntarily from FIFA while 
under investigation, or have been indicted or investigated by law 
enforcement from the United States and other countries.67 
FIFA commissioned an investigation by former U.S. Attorney 
Michael J. Garcia into corruption in the 2018/2022 bidding process 
and posted that report to the public in June 2017.68 This report as 
well as an earlier summary of it by FIFA’s ethics chief show that 
it has found corruption in the bid, including by Bin Hammam, who 
at the time was president of the AFC and had a vote for the 2018 
and 2022 bids.69 With voluminous electronic records and eyewit-
ness reports, two Sunday Times investigative journalists have also 
characterized Bin Hammam as orchestrating the “campaign to buy 
World Cup support” for his native country.70 He arranged for the 
other Asian bidders—from Japan and Korea—to support each 
other in later rounds of voting if their bids were eliminated.71 He 
also supported the joint Spanish/Portuguese bid for the 2018 
World Cup with Asian ExCo votes, in exchange for votes for the 
Qatar 2022 bid from ExCo members from Spain and Argentina, 
                                                                                                            
2022 World Cup bid committee denies corruption allegations and says Mohamed Bin 
Hammam had no association with them, DAILY MAIL (June 1, 2014, 11:27 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2645377/Qatar-2022-World-Cup 
-bid-committee-denies-corruption-allegations-say-Mohamed-Bin-Hamman-no 
-association-them.html [hereinafter Qatar Bid Committee Denial]. 
67 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 24. 
68 See Garcia & Borbély, supra note 15, at 8–36, passim; see FIFA statement 
on recent media coverage regarding the “Garcia Report,” FIFA (June 27, 2017), 
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2017/m=6/news=fifa-statement-on-re 
cent-media-coverage-regarding-the-garcia-report-2898791.html [https://perma 
.cc/CH9X-MBQM]. 
69 Garcia & Borbély, supra note 15, at 230–49; Hans Joachim Eckert, Statement 
of the Chairman of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee on 
the Report on the Inquiry into the 2018/2022 FIFA World Cup Bidding Process 
Prepared by the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee 28 (Nov. 13, 
2014), http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02 
/47/41/75/statementchairmanadjcheckert_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/U999 
-BW2U] [hereinafter Eckert Summary]; Keogh, supra note 58. 
70 BLAKE & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 3; see also Mohamed Bin Hammam 
resigns from football, banned for life, FIFA (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.fifa.com 
/governance/news/y=2012/m=12/news=mohamed-bin-hammam-resigns-from-foot 
ball-banned-for-life-1973422.html [https://perma.cc/SZ65-VLNT]. 
71 See BLAKE & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 176–77. 
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as well as Ricardo Teixeira of Brazil.72 He secured other votes 
through lavish junkets and cash payments, including to members 
of several African national soccer associations.73 The most notable 
of the bribes involved ExCo member Jack Warner of Trinidad and 
Tobago, with payments of over $1 million wired to Warner and to 
Warner’s sons Daryll and Daryan.74 Bin Hammam also paid hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in legal and detective fees to support 
the appeal of suspended ExCo member Reynald Temarii, an ap-
peal that kept his seat vacant during the balloting and essentially 
eliminated a vote that would have gone to the USSF.75 All told, the 
vote swapping, bribes, and support for Temarii were more than 
enough to steer the 2022 World Cup away from the USSF.76 The 
investigative journalists have written that an agent of Bin Hammam 
who made illicit payments was also employed by the Qatar bid 
committee; the QFA denies any more than a passing association 
with Bin Hammam.77 
These private sources of facts about bid corruption have re-
ceived a boost from U.S. and Swiss criminal investigations.78 The 
DOJ unsealed indictments and convictions in May and December 
                                                                                                            
72 Id. at 212; see also Owen Gibson, FIFA under new pressure over Mohamed 
bin Hammam’s Qatar 2022 role, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:00 PM), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/football/2015/apr/22/fifa-mohamed-bin-hammam-qatar 
-2022-world-cup [https://perma.cc/YAE7-263L] (reporting that FIFA president 
Sepp Blatter “confirmed that a ‘bundle’ of votes were traded between Qatar 
and Spain/Portugal”). 
73 Garcia & Borbély, supra note 15, at 232–33. 
74 BLAKE & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 390–97; Garcia & Borbély, supra note 
15, at 233–37. 
75 BLAKE & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 256–57, 261–63, 266; David Bond, 
FIFA bans Adamu and Temarii over World Cup vote claims, BBC SPORT (Nov. 18, 
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/9203378.stm [https://perma.cc 
/F93X-LLZQ]; Garcia & Borbély, supra note 15, at 240–49. 
76 See, e.g., Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 55 (listing ten tainted votes). 
77 Compare BLAKE & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 72–73, 101–02, 122 (de-
scribing deputy chief executive of the Qatar Bid Committee Ali Al-Thawadi as 
the point of contact between Bin Hammam and the Bid Committee, and ex-
plaining how Najeeb Cherikal contracted with the Bid Committee to provide 
“international relations” services and also made illicit payments on behalf of 
Bin Hammam), with Qatar Bid Committee Denial, supra note 66 (acknowledg-
ing acquaintance with Bin Hammam as a FIFA executive but denying any wrong-
doing or association with Bin Hammam as part of winning the World Cup bid). 
78 See Brantley Adams, World Cup 2022: From FIFA to Terrorism, 5 MISS. 
SPORTS L. REV. 191, 196 (2016). 
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of 2015 against several persons associated with international soc-
cer for racketeering, money laundering, and wire fraud.79 The in-
dicted include several ExCo members who voted on the 2022 World 
Cup like Warner and Teixeira, while the convicted include Daryan 
Warner.80 The U.S. charges do not relate to the World Cup, but 
the FBI continues to investigate World Cup bid corruption, and for-
mer Attorney General Loretta Lynch has stated that additional 
charges are likely.81 The FBI has interviewed Almajid,82 and Bin 
Hammam remains a subject of investigation because he is listed 
as “Co-Conspirator #8” in the superseding indictment because of 
the payments to Jack Warner.83 
Further, FIFA is a Swiss entity, so Swiss officials are also 
involved.84 Part of this is assistance with U.S. actions: the Swiss 
Federal Office of Justice has arrested the accused, assisted with 
extradition, frozen bank accounts, and shared information.85 The 
Swiss OAG is also conducting its own investigation of the 2018 and 
2022 World Cup bids.86 The Swiss OAG has seized nine terabytes 
of data from FIFA, as well as frozen numerous Swiss bank accounts, 
                                                                                                            
79 Superseding Indictment at 37, United States v. Hawit, No. 15-CR-252 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/797261/download [https:// 
perma.cc/HG6U-C4GF]; Indictment, United States v. Webb, No. 15-CR-252 
(E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/450211/download [https:// 
perma.cc/69SL-PWBV]; Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives In-
dicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, DEP’T OF JUST. (May 27, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives 
-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and [https://perma.cc/CM63-5W2J]; Sixteen 
Additional FIFA Officials Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corrup-
tion, DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sixteen-addi 
tional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and-corruption [https:// 
perma.cc/7DRK-85H7]; see also Bean, supra note 8, at 367–69 (summarizing 
the indictments and the Attorney General’s relevant statements). 
80 Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, at 259–60. 
81 Bean, supra note 8, at 369–70; Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, 
at 259–60. 
82 Hosenball, supra note 65. 
83 Superseding Indictment at 34, United States v. Hawit, No. 15-CR-252 (filed 
Nov. 25, 2015) (“At various times relevant to the Indictment, Co-Conspirator 
#8 was a high-ranking official of FIFA and AFC, the regional confederation 
representing much of Asia.”). 
84 See, e.g., Bean, supra note 8, at 370, 375. 
85 DOJ Charges Leaders, supra note 10, at 675–76. 
86 Id. at 676; see also OAG Seizes, supra note 9. 
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because of information related to eighty-one “suspicious bank [ac-
tivities].”87 Based upon a tip from a whistleblower, the OAG raided 
FIFA headquarters in June 2016 and seized additional documents.88 
II. LEGAL ACTIONS BASED UPON THE LOST WORLD CUP BUMP 
The mounting evidence of corruption seemingly means lit-
tle for MLS.89 After all, the corruption will not alter the fact that 
the QFA will host in 2022.90 FIFA’s investigation of the 2018 and 
2022 bids confirmed some wrongdoing, but FIFA’s ethics chief never-
theless concluded that the corruption did not affect the outcome 
of the bid.91 The result is that FIFA will not strip the QFA of hosting 
rights or call for a rebid.92 Also, the World Cup does not directly in-
volve MLS.93 Professional leagues do not host the tournament or field 
its teams, so it is the USSF that lost the hosting right, and it is 
the USMNT that lost the automatic qualifying slot as host team.94 
The USSF and MLS do collaborate on USMNT issues, but MLS 
remains a separate entity with no grounds to challenge the QFA as 
host.95 If MLS is interested in recovering money damages rather 
than seeking a 2022 World Cup USA, however, then the evidence 
of corruption matters because this once-a-generation opportunity 
                                                                                                            
87 OAG Seizes, supra note 9; Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, at 260. 
88 Swiss authorities search FIFA HQ as part of criminal investigation, GUARDIAN 
(June 3, 2016, 8:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/03 
/swiss-authorities-search-fifa-headquarters-criminal-investigation-2018-2022 
-world-cup [https://perma.cc/9RYP-DH4B]. 
89 See Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 34. 
90 See Vincent Sheu, Note, Corrupt Passions: An Analysis of the FIFA Indict-
ments, 18 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 65, 81 (2016). 
91 See Eckert Summary, supra note 69, at 40 (calling the occurrences of illicit 
acts “of very limited scope”); see also Bean, supra note 8, at 378 (“Notwith-
standing this prima facie case and the stark details of the Qatari bribes, Eckert 
announced that the Ethics Committee had concluded that the selection of Rus-
sia and Qatar for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups was not the result of bribery 
and corruption.”). 
92 Bean, supra note 8, at 379; see also Eckert Summary, supra note 69, at 
40 (writing that the illicit actions did not reach the “threshold of returning to 
the bidding process, let alone reopening it”). 
93 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 34. 
94 See id. at 30. 
95 Id. at 30–31, 53; Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, at 250–51. 
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could have benefitted MLS by providing the means for a significant 
bump in attendance that correlates to increased revenue.96 
A. The World Cup/Euro Cup Bump 
In a 2014 study, economists Drut and Szymanski examined 
professional soccer attendance in nations that hosted ten interna-
tional soccer championships.97 These include the six World Cups 
in England (1966), West Germany (1974), Italy (1990), France 
(1998), Japan and Korea as joint hosts (2002), and Germany 
(2006).98 The study also includes the four European Champion-
ships in West Germany (1988), England (1996), the Netherlands 
as co-host (2000), and Switzerland as co-host (2008).99 The de-
pendent variable was average annual attendance at league 
games.100 Because tournament hosts are typically named about six 
years in advance of the tournament, the authors gathered public 
data about league attendance starting five seasons before the 
tournament, the season immediately preceding it (European 
league championships are in the spring while tournaments are in 
the summer), and the five seasons following it.101 The attendance 
data for Japan and Korea were provided by individuals rather 
than a public source.102 The largest number of observations were 
for tier-one leagues, although the authors also studied several 
tier-two leagues and the English tier-three and tier-four leagues.103 
In addition to time, the authors had to account for other variables 
that could affect attendance, such as an individual club’s standing 
within the league—based on studies that better teams draw 
larger crowds—as well as whether a club’s stadium hosted a tour-
nament game.104 
                                                                                                            
96 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 34–35. 
97 Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 2. 
98 Id. at 5. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 9. 
101 Id. at 5, 11. 
102 Id. at 5. 
103 Id. at 8 (noting that 44 percent of observations were for “top division clubs 
for every country,” with the remainder for second-tier club attendance across 
various countries, and third- and fourth-tier club attendance in England). 
104 See id. at 5–8. 
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Through a “regression approach,” the authors arrived at “a 
better estimate of the size and significance of the hosting ef-
fect.”105 Their analysis revealed “a clear change before and after 
the mega event.”106 Based on a full sample of eleven World Cups 
and Euro Cups, the league season in which the tournament takes 
place—which immediately precedes the tournament—saw “a sig-
nificant increase in average attendance of around 1,000 fans per 
game.”107 The next season averages another 1,000, with about 700 
per game average the following three seasons.108 The increase was 
highest for tier-one teams—with 1,300 fans per game in the year 
the tournament takes place and the seasons following showing 
growth to “around 3,900–4,400 per game after five years”109—and 
for clubs whose stadiums hosted tournament matches.110 
Drut and Szymanski also took a more detailed look at av-
erage attendance data in English soccer before and after the 1996 
European Cup held in England.111 Using a regression approach, 
the authors found results similar to those from the full sample of 
eleven mega events: average attendance in the first season after 
Euro ’96 went up by about 1,300 fans, and there were smaller in-
creases for each season up to five years after Euro Cup ’96.112 Fur-
thermore, the authors estimate that the revenue bump associated 
with a World Cup in the UK would be approximately €500 million 
over five years.113 
B. Legal Recourse for U.S. Soccer Interests 
Losing the chance to host the 2022 World Cup USA directly 
impacts MLS: its single-entity structure means that—unlike most 
professional leagues where the teams are franchises—MLS owns 
                                                                                                            
105 Id. at 7. 
106 Id. at 11. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. These numbers show an average percentage increase between 17–21 
percent for clubs whose stadiums hosted a tournament game, and between 8–20 
percent for non-hosting clubs for each of five seasons following the tournament. 
Id. at 2. 
111 Id. at 13–19. 
112 Id. at 18. 
113 Id. at 20. 
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the teams.114 Accordingly, all lost ticket sales mean lost revenue 
for MLS, which in turn diminishes the business value of MLS.115 
In a prior article, we explored the potential for MLS to win a judg-
ment under New York law for tortious interference with prospec-
tive economic advantage against Bin Hammam.116 MLS faces few 
procedural obstacles to suing Bin Hammam in New York for tor-
tious interference with prospective economic advantage.117 MLS 
is headquartered in New York City, and Bin Hammam is subject 
to jurisdiction there under the Calder effects test.118 The choice of 
law balances to New York, the place where the last element of the 
tort—harm via lost revenues—would be completed.119 If MLS 
serves him properly, the resulting judgment (though not includ-
ing interest) is likely enforceable in Qatar.120 
The substantive law also favors MLS.121 Under New York 
law, tortious interference requires: 
the plaintiff must allege that “(1) it had a business relationship 
with a third party; (2) the defendant knew of that relationship 
and intentionally interfered with it; (3) the defendant acted 
solely out of malice, or used dishonest, unfair, or improper 
                                                                                                            
114 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 35–36; see About Major League Soccer, 
MLS PRESSBOX, http://pressbox.mlssoccer.com/content/about-major-league-soccer 
[https://perma.cc/5SA7-NECX] (“Major League Soccer is structured as a single, 
limited liability company (single-entity). In the single-entity business struc-
ture, club operators own a financial stake in the League, not just their individ-
ual team.”). For more details about the single-entity structure, see, e.g., 
Bezbatchenko, supra note 20, at 623–40; Decurtins, supra note 20, at 333–36; 
Jakobsze, supra note 20, at 147–48; Lenihan, supra note 28, at 882, 888–89. 
115 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 34–43. 
116 See id. at 50–56, 58–65. 
117 Id. at 51–52, 58. 
118 See id. at 51; Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1984); see also 
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am. Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 682 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that 
the state where a corporation has its national headquarters is its domicile). 
119 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 51–52; see Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 
683; Devore v. Pfizer, Inc., 867 N.Y.S.2d 425, 428 (App. Div. 2008). Because the 
final element of tortious interference, harm, will not materialize until the 
World Cup in 2022, MLS’s claim is not ripe until then, so the statute of limita-
tions will not bar the claim. See Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp., 612 N.E.2d 289, 
290, 292 (1993); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(4) (McKinney 2017) (providing three-year 
limitations period). 
120 See Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 59–65. 
121 See id. at 53–55. 
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means; and (4) the defendant’s interference caused injury to 
the relationship.”122 
Element one seems to kill the claim because the USSF, not 
MLS, was the bidder for the World Cup hosting rights.123 The 
plaintiff can be an entity in a close business relationship with the 
bidder, however, such as a wholly owned subsidiary.124 FIFA 
rules require that professional leagues like MLS be sanctioned by 
national associations like the USSF,125 plus “MLS and the USSF 
collaborate on national team issues, the MLS president served on 
the USA Bid Committee, and MLS donated office space and $2 
million to the bid.”126 Regarding the second element of tortious 
interference, Bin Hammam, as an ExCo voter, would have known 
the importance of the 2022 World Cup to MLS because this fact 
was cited in FIFA’s evaluation of the USSF bid.127 The acts of brib-
ery, vote-swapping, and paying for Temarii’s appeal specifically 
to deny the USSF a vote show the intention required in element 
two and “improper means” in element three.128 Finally, but for Bin 
                                                                                                            
122 Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 400 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Carvel 
Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6, 17 (2d Cir. 2003) (referring to the cause of action 
as “the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations”)). 
123 See Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 31–33, 53. 
124 Kirch, 449 F.3d at 400–01. 
125 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 35 (citing Professional Council, 
U.S. SOCCER FED’N, http://www.ussoccer.com/about/affiliates/professional-soc 
cer [https://perma.cc/7HS2-JKG6] (listing MLS as a member of the USSF Pro-
fessional Council)); Associations: USA: U.S. Soccer Federation, FIFA, http://www 
.fifa.com/associations/association=usa/ [https://perma.cc/H8H7-RPTG] (listing 
MLS as the National League for the USSF). 
126 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 53; see USA Bid Receives, supra 
note 2; see also Gandert & Epstein, supra note 1, at 34 (calling MLS an “affiliate” 
of the USSF that “can be viewed as a member of the association”). 
127 2022 FIFA WORLD CUP BID EVALUATION REPORT: USA, FIFA (2010), 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/competition/01/33/74/56/b9qate 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/APM4-HRDT] [hereinafter USA BID EVALUATION REPORT]. 
128 See Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 53–55; Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 
818 N.E.2d 1100, 1103–04 (2004) (requiring the defendant’s conduct to be “criminal 
or independently tortious,” or the defendant to use “wrongful means” like force 
or fraud or meritless litigation); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00 (McKinney 
2017) (“A person is guilty of commercial bribing in the second degree when he 
confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent or 
fiduciary without the consent of the latter’s employer or principal, with intent 
to influence his conduct in relation to his employer’s or principal’s affairs.”). 
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Hammam’s pacts with six voters, bribes to three more, and legal 
fees to another to keep a pro-USSF vote out of the process alto-
gether, the USSF more likely than not would have won the bid.129 
That lost bid resulted in injury to MLS in the loss of revenue that 
additional spectators would have generated.130 
Bin Hammam has sufficient personal assets to satisfy a 
large judgment.131 And the judgment would be large, even when 
assuming the lowest World Cup bump percentage estimated by 
Drut and Szymanski and the most conservative financial varia-
bles.132 Doing an ordinary least squares regression analysis based 
on game-level attendance from 2004 to 2015, and based on an as-
sumption of twenty-four MLS teams by 2026,133 the five-year at-
tendance for MLS from 2022 to 2026 is predicted to be 44,670,464, 
which means 4,121,961 more fans would have attended if there were 
a World Cup USA.134 At $54 per ticket (and assuming no increase 
in price except by inflation and without considering game-day 
concession sales), MLS lost revenue equals $271 million.135 Only the 
portion of revenues that lead to profit are recoverable as actual dam-
ages, but revenues do allow for computation of the diminution in 
MLS’s business value as measured by revenue multiples.136 Taking 
                                                                                                            
129 See Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 55–56. 
130 See id. at 56–57. 
131 See BLAKE & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 6 (referring to Bin Hammam’s 
“Doha mansion”); id. at 11–15 (describing how Bin Hammam earned billions 
as construction in Doha boomed along with Qatar’s oil and gas revenues); About 
Us, KEMCO GRP., http://www.kemco-qatar.com/AboutUs.html [https://perma.cc 
/3CK2-HYU4] (“Since 1985 KEMCO became a Sole Proprietorship owned by 
Mr. Mohammed Bin Hammam Al Abdulla.”). 
132 See Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 57–58, 66. 
133 MLS sets new attendance records, Seattle hold highest average in league, 
MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:18 PM), https://www.mlssoccer.com/post 
/2015/10/26/mls-sets-new-attendance-records-seattle-hold-highest-average-league 
[https://perma.cc/F9JN-76CG] (stating league-wide total attendance as 7,225,053). 
134 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 36–40. These estimates were based 
on the assumption that MLS would expand to twenty-four teams by 2022. Id. 
at 35–36, 38. MLS has subsequently announced plans to expand to twenty-six 
teams. Ben Couch, MLS announces expansion process and timeline, MAJOR LEAGUE 
SOCCER (Dec. 15, 2016, 4:33 PM), http://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2016/12/15 
/mls-announces-expansion-process-and-timeline [https://perma.cc/4MQG-RDLN]. 
135 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 38–39. 
136 Id. at 42–43. Experts have a number of market approaches to value a 
business, including “[u]sing known ratios from valuing comparables to measure 
losses.” Mark A. Allen, Robert E. Hall & Victoria A. Lazear, Reference Guide 
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the most conservative estimate of a 4.3 revenue multiple—deter-
mined by dividing the Los Angeles Football Club expansion fee of 
$110 million by the Forbes estimate of annual revenues of $26.5 
million per team—MLS would suffer actual damages of at least 
$261 million and potentially as much as $1 billion.137 
If the U.S. DOJ or Swiss OAG uncovers sufficient evidence 
of corruption by any current active football officials or organiza-
tion—such as establishing a conspiratorial link between the QFA 
and Bin Hammam or showing independent bribes paid by the 
QFA or its agents—then MLS could pursue arbitration against 
them in the CAS under Swiss anticorruption law.138 FIFA rules 
require that disputes among confederations, associations, teams, 
players, or officials be resolved through FIFA’s internal dispute 
resolution mechanisms—and they expressly prohibit recourse to 
national courts.139 Those rules also allow for application of Swiss 
law and submission of claims to arbitration in the CAS.140 The 
Swiss FAUC expressly prohibits private sector offering and ac-
cepting of bribes and other “undue advantage” that harm a person 
or company’s business interests.141 It also provides for the recovery 
                                                                                                            
on Estimation of Economic Damages, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCI. EVIDENCE 425, 444 (3d ed. 2011). 
137 See Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 42–43; Chris Smith, Major 
League Soccer’s Most Valuable Teams 2015, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2015, 12:32 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2015/08/19/major-league-soccers-most 
-valuable-teams-2015-2/#2715e4857a0b78003b643ba4 [hereinafter Smith, Most 
Valuable MLS Teams]; Baxter, supra note 47 (showing that the Los Angeles 
Football Club paid a $110 million expansion fee). 
138 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 67–69; see Todd & Jewell, Reclaim-
ing, supra note 3, at 273 (concluding that the alleged corrupt acts of Bin Hammam 
and persons associated with the QFA are proscribed by article 4a of the FAUC). 
139 FIFA STATUTES, supra note 18, at art. 67, §§ 2, 3(c); id. at art. 68, § 2. 
See Youd, supra note 4, at 179 (quoting 2 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, 
INT’L SPORTS L. & BUS. 1461 (1999)) (“FIFA rules require all those subject to 
its jurisdiction to waive any right to take recourse to the courts ....”). 
140 FIFA STATUTES, supra note 18, at art. 66 (recognizing CAS power to re-
solve FIFA disputes applying Swiss law). 
141 SWISS FED. ACT ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 19, at art. 4a; see 
Michael Ritscher & Stefan J. Schröter, Country Reports: Switzerland, in INT’L 
HANDBOOK ON UNFAIR COMPETITION 547, passim (Frauke Henning-Bodewig 
ed. 2013) (analyzing Swiss unfair competition law with a focus on the FAUC); 
Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, at 272–73 (translating the relevant 
provisions of art. 4a into English). 
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of money damages.142 National courts recognize that CAS awards 
are valid, and any arbitral award should be confirmed by Qatari 
courts because Qatar is a party to the New York Convention.143 
MLS is not the only entity that could pursue a claim in court 
or through arbitration.144 MLS may own all teams, but new teams 
come into the league through individuals or companies that pay an 
expansion fee and then become part of the MLS Board of Gover-
nors.145 Most of these investors then procure separate contracts 
for local operation of the teams, thus becoming investor-operators.146 
Part of the compensation is one-half of the revenue from ticket sales 
and from concessions.147 A team like the Seattle Sounders plays 
in an NFL stadium, and a 21 percent attendance bump in just its 
first year following the World Cup would mean an increase from 
44,247 to an NFL-level 53,096 per game—and attendance would 
continue to increase for years thereafter.148 One-half of lost ticket 
revenue plus concessions (estimated at $73) over a seventeen-
game home season times five seasons equates to several million 
dollars in lost revenue.149 Forbes estimated that ten of the then-
nineteen MLS teams in 2013 were profitable,150 so a joint action 
                                                                                                            
142 SWISS FED. ACT ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 19, at art. 9, § 3. 
143 Sean Rassel, The Necessity for National Federations to Stand Up for 
Themselves, 20 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 797, 811, 820 (2012); see Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 
21 U.S.T. 2518 (the New York Convention). 
144 Lenihan, supra note 28, at 888. 
145 Bezbatchenko, supra note 20, at 624–25; Lenihan, supra note 28, at 888; 
Taylor, supra note 28, at 3–4; see Decurtins, supra note 20, at 333–34 (writing 
that investors benefit from the league as a whole as well as individually). 
146 Bezbatchenko, supra note 20, at 624–25. 
147 Id. at 625; Decurtins, supra note 20, at 333. 
148 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 31 (citing MLS sets new attendance 
records, Seattle hold highest average in league, MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER (Oct. 26, 
2015), http://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2015/10/26/mls-sets-new-attendance-records 
-seattle-hold-highest-average-league [https://perma.cc/Z4FY-G33K]; NFL Atten-
dance—2015, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/nfl/attendance/_/year/2015 [https:// 
perma.cc/8B2Q-AETY] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (reporting the average per game 
attendance for each NFL team during the 2015 season)); see Facilities, SEATTLE 
SOUNDERS FC, http://www.soundersfc.com/team/facilities [http://perma.cc/S4WH 
-9EHQ] (stating that both the Sounders and the Seahawks play in the 67,000-
person-capacity CenturyLink field). 
149 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 38–39. 
150 Chris Smith, Major League Soccer’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES 
(Nov. 20, 2013, 1:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/11/20 
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by investor-operators to recover lost profits might be worth the 
time and cost of litigation or arbitration.151 
III. DUBIOUS ASSUMPTIONS IN ECONOMIC MODELS 
Economists use regression analysis to construct sophisti-
cated models that handle large amounts of data and numerous 
variables to show relationships that allow an inference of particular 
causal factors.152 As business litigation has grown more complex, 
this powerful tool has become “ubiquitous” to support economists’ 
expert testimony about damages in cases including commercial 
torts.153 Under the Supreme Court’s Daubert trilogy as well as 
state analogues,154 courts routinely admit such testimony.155 Eco-
nomic models are nevertheless open to challenge by the opposing 
party, who sometimes succeed by turning the complexity of the 
model on itself and attacking the assumptions underlying it.156 
All economic models rely upon assumptions, which are the ex-
plicit or implicit arguments that markets behave a certain way or 
that particular businesses are similar or that certain events would 
                                                                                                            
/major-league-soccers-most-valuable-teams/#20964ea419a6 [http://perma.cc/D8 
A5-HP8X]; see Decurtins, supra note 20, at 336–37 (writing that, based on publicly 
available information the majority of teams seem to operate at a profit). 
151 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 67–68; see 16 LEE S. KREINDLER ET 
AL., N. Y. PRAC., N.Y. L. OF TORTS § 21:107 (2016) (“In an action for business 
torts ... the appropriate measure of damages is the amount of loss sustained by the 
plaintiff, including lost opportunities for profit, or stated differently, the amount 
which the plaintiff would have made except for the defendant’s wrong.”). 
152 E.g., Allensworth, supra note 32, at 836–37; David L. Rubinfeld, Refer-
ence Guide on Multiple Regression, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL 
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 303, 305, 309–10 (3d ed. 2011); Alan O. Sykes, An 
Introduction to Regression Analysis, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 1, 1 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). 
153 Allensworth, supra note 32, at 835; Hill et al., supra note 29, at 297–98. 
154 Todd & Jewell, Dubious, supra note 29, at 38–39 (concluding that state 
courts use the same rationales as federal courts in ruling on the admissibility 
of economic expert testimony); see Fed. R. Evid. 702 (amended Apr. 17, 2000, 
effective Dec. 1, 2000) (enumerating the standards for the admission of expert 
testimony); see generally Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
155 Hill et al., supra note 29, at 302; Molly L. Zohn, Note, How Antitrust 
Damages Measure Up with Respect to the Daubert Factors, 13 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 697, 727 (2005). 
156 Todd & Jewell, Dubious, supra note 29, at 45–48. 
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have occurred.157 If even one key assumption is “dubious,” how-
ever, then the model’s results are suspect.158 In litigation, this 
means that courts exclude expert testimony relying upon the 
model, sometimes resulting in the plaintiff losing the case.159 
One category of dubious assumptions is when the modeler 
makes inapt comparisons to markets, businesses, or products.160 
Comparisons are common in complex litigation like antitrust and 
commercial tort cases where the plaintiff claims that a competitor 
has prevented it from entering a market or winning a contract.161 
Because the business lacks a record by which to compute damages, 
courts allow plaintiffs to make a comparison to another “yardstick” 
business or product that is substantially similar.162 The underly-
ing assumption is that, but for the anticompetitive act or tortious 
conduct, plaintiff would have performed like the comparator, thus 
providing a measure for damages.163 To establish the evidentiary 
foundation, the expert must show that something like the but-for 
                                                                                                            
157 E.g., Allensworth, supra note 32, at 828 (claiming that models blend sci-
ence and art so that “choices and assumptions” go into the model); JONATHAN 
SCHLEFER, THE ASSUMPTIONS ECONOMISTS MAKE 278 (2012) (writing that econ-
omists “need a sound argument for why [their] assumption is generally realis-
tic”); id. at 25 (writing that economists “make simplified assumptions about the 
world we inhabit and construct imaginary economies—in other words, models—
based on those assumptions”); see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Relaxing Traditional 
Economic Assumptions and Values: Toward a New Multidisciplinary Discourse 
on Law, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181, 183 (1991) (listing neoclassical assumptions 
common to economics); Daniel M. Tracer, Note, Overcharge but Don’t Overestimate: 
Calculating Damages for Antitrust Injuries in Two-Sided Markets, 33 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 807, 821 (2011) (writing about the “practical concerns” of calculating lost 
profits in antitrust cases because the “incredibly complex calculation ... requires 
many assumptions to be made about the plaintiff, the defendant, the markets 
in which they operate, and other related and uncertain future conditions”). 
158 Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 
Q.J. OF ECON. 65, 65 (1956) (“When the results of a theory seem to flow specif-
ically from a special crucial assumption, then if the assumption is dubious, the 
results are suspect.”). 
159 Hill et al., supra note 29, at 311; Lloyd, supra note 29, at 399–400; Todd 
& Jewell, Dubious, supra note 29, at 38. 
160 Todd & Jewell, Dubious, supra note 29, at 22–25. 
161 Roger D. Blair & Amanda Kay Esquibel, Yardstick Damages in Lost 
Profit Cases: An Econometric Approach, 72 DENV. U.L. REV. 113, 113–14 (1994). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 114. 
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scenario has actually happened, either to it or to a similar firm, 
under comparable circumstances.164 
When the yardstick is not a reasonable comparator, however, 
courts reject the assumption as too speculative.165 In one pre-Daubert 
case, Home Placement Service, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., the 
plaintiff used its own offices in Nashville as a yardstick for dam-
ages at its Providence franchise.166 The court concluded that the 
comparison failed to account for differences between the markets, 
such as different regional rental patterns, unemployment, colleges, 
and summer rentals.167 As economic models have become more 
complex, the number of assumptions underlying them has in-
creased, thus exposing them to more points of attack.168 Consider 
Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., where the defendant asbestos manufac-
turers filed for bankruptcy, and the experts for a trust of asbestosis 
victims performed numerous calculations to value the companies 
and determine the potential tort liabilities, which were based in 
part upon comparisons to other businesses.169 The trial court ex-
cluded the testimony because of “indicia of unreliability” like the 
expert’s “inability to explain a number of variables and assump-
tions used in his analysis, such as price/earnings multipliers, in-
come projections, and which companies were comparable to those 
being valued.”170 
The single assumption that unlike comparators are similar 
can doom even the most sophisticated damages model.171 In Amer-
ican Booksellers Association v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., independent 
bookstores alleged that the defendant large bookstores received 
secret discounts not available to them in violation of federal anti-
trust law and California unfair competition law.172 They relied 
                                                                                                            
164 Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, “Speculative” Antitrust Damages, 70 
WASH. L. REV. 423, 436 (1995). 
165 Blair & Esquibel, supra note 161, at 117. 
166 Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 
1205 (1st Cir. 1987). 
167 Id. 
168 Todd & Jewell, Dubious, supra note 29, at 45. 
169 Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 99 Fed. Appx. 274, 276–79, 282 (2d Cir. 2004). 
170 Id. at 279. 
171 Todd & Jewell, Dubious, supra note 29, at 45–46. 
172 Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 
1035 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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upon an expert’s economic simulation model to show the differ-
ence in prices paid between plaintiffs and defendants as proof of 
causation as well as amount of damages.173 The trial court granted 
summary judgment to defendants for plaintiffs’ claims for dam-
ages under the Robinson-Patman Act.174 The court found the 
model “entirely too speculative to support a jury verdict” because 
the “model contains entirely too many assumptions and simplifi-
cations that are not supported by real-world evidence.”175 Nota-
bly, the court ruled that, even if the model were admissible to 
prove causation, the online and mail-order defendants would still 
be entitled to summary judgment because the model relied en-
tirely upon competition between “physical stores in the same geo-
graphic location.”176 
Courts have shown skepticism when economists opine that 
American and European consumers will respond to the same 
product in the same way.177 Schonfeld v. Hilliard was a fraud and 
contract case related to plaintiffs’ attempt to start a television 
network that used BBC programming.178 The trial court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that “Schonfeld 
could not prove, with reasonable certainty, the existence or 
amount of damages for lost profits.”179 The Circuit Court af-
firmed,180 noting the “seemingly endless list of assumptions upon 
which [the] expert relied in determining lost profits” and his fail-
ure to account for market risks.181 One assumption was that a new 
business entity would see profits of $112 to $269 million despite 
introducing “a new product, the ‘Americanized’ version [of BBC 
international news], into a new market, the United States.”182 Cit-
ing the “chilly reception” that New York courts give to “claims for 
profits lost in unsuccessful entertainment ventures” because of 
“the changing whims and artistic tastes of the general public,” the 
                                                                                                            
173 Id. at 1037. 
174 Id. at 1042. 
175 Id. at 1041–42. 
176 Id. at 1042. 
177 See generally Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 173 (2d Cir. 2000). 
178 Id. at 168–70. 
179 Id. at 171 (citing Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 493 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1986)). 
180 Id. at 172–73. 
181 Id. at 173–74. 
182 Id. at 171, 173 (emphasis in original). 
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court found that the assumptions about financing, advertising, 
and market reach relied upon by the expert were unrealistic.183 
Another case rejecting assumptions about the fungibility of 
products across markets is Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara 
Lee Hosiery, where the Lithuanian distributor brought fraud, con-
tract, tortious interference, and other claims against a U.S. man-
ufacturer for allegedly defective pantyhose.184 The court cited 
General Electric Co. v. Joiner and other authority for the proposi-
tion that courts should reject expert testimony that is too specu-
lative as a matter of law.185 The court ruled the testimony of the 
damages expert inadmissible because of “dubious assumptions,” 
including several unfounded comparisons.186 The expert failed to 
distinguish between former and current clients of Sara Lee; he 
compared Lithuanian Commerce Corp. to two domestic distributors 
that would not face the same tax, tariff, and import restrictions; 
and he relied upon a study of U.S. women’s purchasing patterns for 
pantyhose to predict the amount of purchases by Baltic women.187 
Commentators have suggested that this last type of assumption 
is problematic because a model’s reliance on a single study brings 
a risk of being misled by an error or statistical fluke.188 
Courts have also faulted testimony that fails to distinguish 
product quality.189 The court in In re Live Concert Antitrust Liti-
gation excluded expert testimony because the regression analysis 
omitted important explanatory variables.190 Plaintiffs alleged 
that Clear Channel engaged in monopolistic practices in its pro-
motion of music concerts that resulted in higher ticket prices.191 
They submitted expert testimony based on regression analysis to 
                                                                                                            
183 Id. at 174. 
184 Lithuanian Comm. Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 179 F.R.D. 450, 454 
(D.N.J. 1998). 
185 Id. at 457 (citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 519 (1997); 
Target Mkt. Pub., Inc. v. ADVO, Inc., 136 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
186 Id. at 460–62. 
187 Id. at 460–61. 
188 Kevin A. Kordana & Terrance O’Reilly, Daubert and Litigation-Driven 
Econometrics, 87 VA. L. REV. 2019, 2026 (2001) (quoting The New NBER: Has 
Scholarship Been Hurt?, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 1980, at 95 (quoting Feldstein)). 
189 See generally In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 863 F. Supp. 2d 966, 
982 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 969. 
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show the increase in ticket prices from 2000 (the year Clear Chan-
nel acquired promotion company SFX) until 2006 for rock concerts 
and the resulting damages.192 The court concluded that the expert 
had failed to test the assumption of increased ticket prices relat-
ing to a monopoly by failing to account for two major variables, 
including changes in artist quality during the time period.193 In 
another antitrust case, Freeland v. AT&T Corp., the court ruled 
expert testimony inadmissible for omitting variables based on un-
supported assumptions that changes in the quality of a product 
were not relevant.194 Plaintiffs alleged the illegal tying of cell 
phones to cell plans, but the expert did not account for price dif-
ferences related to the switch from analog to digital phones and 
the incorporation of cameras into phones.195 Court skepticism is 
not limited to economics experts.196 In Pfizer Inc. v. Advanced 
Monobloc Corp., the court excluded a marketing expert’s testi-
mony, in part for assuming without sufficient support that the 
product in question, a premium women’s shave gel, would have 
achieved the same market coverage as the plaintiff’s bargain 
men’s shave gel.197 
Lithuanian Commerce Corp. is instructive because it sug-
gests that a model need not have any one glaring problematic as-
sumption to fail.198 Some assumptions are open to dispute, such 
as if the expert and the opponent disagree on a single assumption 
like whether a variable is necessary.199 The issue is then one of pro-
bity so that the court should admit the testimony and allow the 
jury to resolve the matter.200 Courts will rule as a matter of law, 
however, where the expert makes so many disputable assumptions 
                                                                                                            
192 Id. at 976–77. 
193 Id. at 978–79. 
194 Freeland v. AT&T Corp., 238 F.R.D. 130, 148–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
195 Id. 
196 See generally Pfizer Inc. v. Advanced Monobloc Corp., No. 97C-04-037-
WTQ, 1999 WL 743927, at *15–16, 24 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 1999). 
197 Id. 
198 See id. 
199 David L. Faigman, Christopher Slobogin & John Monahan, Gatekeeping 
Science: Using the Structure of Scientific Research to Distinguish Between Ad-
missibility and Weight in Expert Testimony, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 865–66 (2016) 
(arguing that disputes over key variables in a regression analysis should go to 
the jury rather than be excluded by the judge). 
200 Id. 
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that the model itself is dubious.201 One commentator writes that 
courts view models like that in Lithuanian Commerce Corp. with 
“extreme skepticism” because of the “cumulative effect” of the nu-
merous assumptions.202 In that and other cases, the courts do not 
identify a single assumption as particularly problematic; instead, 
the accumulation of unsupported assumptions weakens the force 
of the conclusions to the point that they are speculative.203 
Arbitral tribunals like CAS are not bound by rules of evi-
dence, so they have considerably more discretion in choosing what 
to admit.204 This discretion may not allow for an economic model 
based upon dubious assumptions.205 After all, the recognition by 
courts and legal commentators that economic models with unrea-
sonable assumptions are suspect accords with economics schol-
ars.206 To explain or predict the “real” world, economic models must 
have assumptions that are “founded on reality.”207 Without a “sound 
argument” for why the underlying assumptions are “generally re-
alistic,” the integrity of the model’s results are open to dispute.208 
As Nobel laureate Robert M. Solow writes, “When the results of a 
theory seem to flow specifically from a special crucial assumption, 
then if the assumption is dubious, the results are suspect.”209 
More recently, Yew-Kwang Ng concluded that unrealistic assump-
tions are acceptable—unless they change the results in a meaningful 
                                                                                                            
201 Hill et al., supra note 29, at 314. 
202 Lloyd, supra note 29, at 402, 409. 
203 Hill et al., supra note 29, at 309–10; see, e.g., Three Crown Ltd. P’ship v. 
Salomon Bros., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 876, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (excluding expert 
testimony because the “damages would rest upon numerous assumptions with-
out the type of support required under the case law”). 
204 Antonio Rigozzi & Brianna Quinn, Evidentiary Issues Before CAS, in 
INT’L SPORTS L. & JURIS. OF THE CAS: 4TH CONFERENCE CAS & SAV/FSA 
LAUSANNE 39 (Michele Bernasconi ed., 2014), https://lk-k.com/?year=2014& 
lawyer=antonio-rigozzi&expertise=&s=&post_type=publication [https://perma 
.cc/G38V-SY4Q]. 
205 SCHLEFER, supra note 157, at 276. 
206 Id. at 276–77. 
207 Id. at 277. 
208 Id. at 278; see id. at xiv (writing that “the real disputes arise about as-
sumptions that underlie a model ... and whether it is at least not wildly inconsistent 
with experience”). 
209 Solow, supra note 158, at 65; see Jack Melitz, Friedman and Machlup on 
the Significance of Testing Economic Assumptions, 73 J. POL. ECON. 37, 44 
(1965) (writing that “any discrepancy between ‘auxiliary’ assumptions and re-
ality raises some likelihood that the experiment is invalid”). 
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way or are misleading.210 Paul Pfleiderer characterizes an eco-
nomic model “built on assumptions with dubious connections to 
the real world” as “harmful” when its results are applied to inform 
decision-making.211 Given that arbitral tribunals necessarily ap-
ply economic models to render a decision about the cause and amount 
of damages, an economic model with unreasonable assumptions 
might fail not merely because of the mandates of U.S. evidence 
law but also because of the expectations of the field of economics.212 
IV.  KEY DIFFERENCES IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN MARKETS 
AND PRODUCTS WEAKEN THE ASSUMPTION OF AN 
MLS WORLD CUP BUMP 
Assuming that MLS attendance following a World Cup will 
mirror what has happened in European countries seems reason-
able, at least in a broad sense. After all, MLS offers a similar prod-
uct as the top European leagues; MLS has even been ranked as 
the number seven professional soccer league in the world, behind 
the major European leagues (EPL, Bundesliga, Spain’s La Liga 
Primera, and Serie A), but on top of lesser European leagues like 
the Netherlands’ Eredivisie and France’s Ligue 1.213 As U.S. courts 
have made clear, however, specific differences in product quality 
can preclude economists from assuming that a comparison is rea-
sonable, and commentators recognize that MLS talent does not 
measure up to the quality of the top European leagues.214 Those 
                                                                                                            
210 Yew-Kwang Ng, Are Unrealistic Assumptions/Simplifications Acceptable? 
Some Methodological Issues in Economics, 21 PAC. ECON. REV. 180, 182 (2016). 
211 Paul Pfleiderer, Camaleones: El Mal Uso de Modelos Teoricos en Finan-
zas y Economia [Chameleon: The Misuse of Theoretical Models in Finance and 
Economics], 16 REVISTA DE ECONOMIA INSTITUCIONAL 23 (2014), https://www 
.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-auth/359071 [https://perma.cc 
/ZDB3-ETRE]. 
212 See generally Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 204, at 39. 
213 Joe Prince-Wright, MLS ranked seventh best soccer league globally ... can 
it break into the top five?, NBC SPORTS (Apr. 23, 2013, 9:04 AM), http://soccer 
.nbcsports.com/2013/04/23/mls-ranked-seventh-best-soccer-league-globally-can-it 
-break-into-the-top-five/ [http://perma.cc/4XS5-N6BF]; see Decurtins, supra note 
20, at 336 (explaining that MLS ranks sixth globally in terms of attendance as 
of 2016). 
214 E.g., Lenihan, supra note 28, at 899 (noting the disparity in salary between 
MLS and top European leagues); Tim Hill, 67% of players say an MLS team 
would survive the Premier League. Are they right?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2016, 
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differences become even more pronounced when contrasting the 
European sports market where soccer reigns supreme with the 
U.S. market and its four other professional sports leagues that 
are each the best in the world.215 Based as it would be upon a single 
study of European league attendance with nothing to link it spe-
cifically to MLS or American consumers, the MLS damages model 
could very well be rejected by a tribunal, whether a U.S. court or 
arbitral body.216 
A.  Differences Without a Difference 
Some differences are unlikely to make applying the Drut 
and Szymanski study unreasonable.217 For example, Drut and 
Szymanski examined attendance for European tier-one and tier-two 
leagues, which are tied to each other through the process of pro-
motion and relegation.218 MLS does not have promotion and rele-
gation, so the on-field performance of its teams bears no relation 
to what happens in the minor league USL or NASL.219 Because 
Drut and Szymanski had the largest observations for tier-one 
                                                                                                            
8:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2016/mar/24/mls-premier 
-league-comparison [http://perma.cc/56MD-63QC] (opining that the very best team 
in MLS would barely avoid relegation in the EPL); Thomas Hautmann, How 
would the best MLS team fare in the Premier League?, FOX SPORTS (Mar. 23, 
2016, 4:30 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/soccer/story/how-would-the-best-mls 
-team-fare-in-the-premier-league-032316 [http://perma.cc/G6ZY-VPDJ] (opin-
ing that the very best team in MLS would be relegated in the EPL because the 
MLS team could not survive the long season with its small payroll). Even Com-
missioner Garber targets 2022 as the year that MLS hopes to be among the 
world’s best leagues, thus tacitly conceding that MLS is not there yet. Id. 
215 Hill, supra note 214. 
216 See generally SCHLEFER, supra note 157, at 208. 
217 See Drut & Szymanski , supra note 22, at 2. 
218 Id. (stating that “the worst performing teams at the end of the season 
are relegated to the next level down, to be replaced by the best performing 
teams from the lower level”). 
219 Chris Smith, New Report Supports MLS Promotion/Relegation, But 
League Still Says No, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2016, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/chrissmith/2016/11/22/new-report-supports-mls-promotionrelegation 
-but-league-still-says-no/#37125c131b9f [https://perma.cc/9CDK-7QFQ]; see 
Lenihan, supra note 28, at 901 (writing that “American soccer has officially become 
a one-league show” because MLS has expanded in part through the addition of 
minor league teams). 
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leagues,220 and because the World Cup bump is far more pro-
nounced in tier-one leagues,221 this difference is likely irrelevant.222 
Also, our prior article assumed the higher attendance 
bump for teams whose cities would host a World Cup match, while 
Drut and Szymanski looked at teams whose stadiums hosted a 
World Cup or Euro Cup match.223 The USSF proposed large NFL 
or major college stadiums like the Meadowlands in New Jersey or 
the Rose Bowl in Pasadena; by contrast, MLS teams have inten-
tionally moved away from massive NFL stadiums to play in sep-
arate, soccer-specific stadiums.224 Because MLS fan attendance 
has grown steadily even as teams change venues,225 this assump-
tion likewise seems reasonable.226 
Another difference is league size.227 FIFA desires that 
top-tier national leagues have no more than twenty teams.228 Five 
top European leagues observe this limit.229 By contrast, MLS ex-
panded to twenty-two teams for the 2017 season, with clubs in 
Los Angeles and Miami expected shortly thereafter.230 MLS has 
announced expansion plans—including a $150 million expansion 
fee each—for four more teams and may even seek to grow to thirty 
or more.231 League size is likely irrelevant when put in the context 
                                                                                                            
220 The authors had 4,263 total observations, with 44 percent for tier-one 
clubs, 30 percent for tier-two clubs, and the remainder for English tier-three 
and tier-four clubs. Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 8. 
221 Id. at 2, 11 (reporting that the World Cup had no effect on English 
tier-three and tier-four attendance and that “[d]ivision two teams seem [sic] 
more modest increases”). 
222 See supra text accompanying notes 220–21. 
223 Compare Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 37 (using the host city 
for MLS clubs without regard for the specific stadium), with Drut & Szymanski, 
supra note 22, at 5 (classifying clubs based on “whether their stadium was used 
to host championship games or not”). 
224 Compare USA BID EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 127, at 11–13, with 
Taylor, supra note 28, at 10–11. 
225 Lenihan, supra note 28, at 897 (noting a 7 percent increase in MLS at-
tendance from the 2010 to the 2011 seasons); Taylor, supra note 28, at 10 (re-
porting that by 2010, nine of the then sixteen teams in 2010 played in soccer 
specific stadiums). 
226 Taylor, supra note 28, at 10. 
227 Id. at 7. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Couch, supra note 134. 
231 Id. 
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of market size.232 MLS is the only tier-one soccer league in the 
U.S. and Canada, which have a combined population of 360 mil-
lion.233 By contrast, the top five tier-one leagues (by starting player 
salaries) play in five European countries with a combined population 
of 323 million.234 
B.  Key Differences in Markets and Products 
These markets differ in one key respect that could affect the 
applicability of the World Cup Bump to MLS, however.235 Soccer 
                                                                                                            
232 See supra text accompanying notes 233–34. 
233 Lenihan, supra note 28, at 901; Taylor, supra note 28, at 7; see World 
Factbook: United States, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/li 
brary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html [https://perma.cc/ZSU4-LSTD] 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (listing the U.S. population as 323,995,528);  World 
Factbook: Canada, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/pub 
lications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html [https://perma.cc/HW5Q-BUMB] (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2018) (listing the Canadian population as 35,362,905). 
234 SPORTING INTELLIGENCE, GLOBAL SPORTS SALARIES SURVEY 26–27, 32–39 
(2016), http://www.globalsportssalaries.com/ [https://perma.cc/9A2X-XPBP] (list-
ing the EPL, La Liga, Serie A, Bundesliga, and Ligue 1 as the top European soccer 
leagues by average player salary); see World Factbook: France, CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr 
.html [https://perma.cc/9HZW-YDJ9] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (listing the pop-
ulation of France as 66,836,154); World Factbook: Germany, CENT. INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos 
/gm.html [https://perma.cc/4V7W-P45W] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (listing the 
population of Germany as 80,722,792); World Factbook: Italy, CENT. INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos 
/it.html [https://perma.cc/TJY9-VVUW] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (listing the 
population of Italy as 62,007,540); World Factbook: Spain, CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sp 
.html [https://perma.cc/VHN9-BJ7Z] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (listing the pop-
ulation of Spain as 48,563,476); World Factbook: United Kingdom, CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact 
book/geos/uk.html [https://perma.cc/XN3W-4MA6] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) 
(listing the population of the UK as 64,430,428). Further, this population num-
ber is high because some Welsh teams are in the EPL and others in a separate 
Welsh tier-one league, while Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate 
tier-one leagues. See Seb Patrick, 10 Things You Should Know About the En-
glish Premier League, BBC AMERICA, http://www.bbcamerica.com/anglophenia 
/2014/08/10-things-know-english-premier-league [https://perma.cc/PA79-R8PP] 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
235 See infra text accompanying notes 236–37. 
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is far and away the most popular sport in Europe,236 so the top 
leagues effectively do not compete against other sports for fans.237 
That reasoning does not hold for MLS, which must contend with 
tier-one professional leagues for four different sports: the NFL, 
MLB, NBA, and NHL.238 The NFL is a special category because 
gridiron football is almost exclusive to the United States, so it has 
no international comparison, yet it is the highest-grossing sports 
league in the world.239 MLS has also avoided direct competition 
with the NFL.240 Although European soccer leagues play fall to 
spring, MLS schedules its season spring to fall.241 Even during the 
September and October overlap, MLS plays primarily on Satur-
days and midweek rather than on Sundays.242 
The MLS season goes head-to-head with the MLB season, 
however, and has some overlap with the NBA and NHL.243 Like 
soccer, these three sports do have global interest, especially in 
Latin America and Asia for baseball and Europe for basketball 
and hockey.244 MLB, NBA, and NHL are regarded as the top 
                                                                                                            
236 Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 4; see Coppage, supra note 20, at 
545 (“Soccer is the most popular sport in the world ....”). 
237 Taylor, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
238 Bezbatchenko, supra note 20, at 635 (“MLS competes with the NFL, 
NBA, MLB, and NHL in today’s saturated sports market.”); Decurtins, supra 
note 20, at 331 (claiming that MLS “does not compete in terms of importance 
with the four major American sports leagues”). 
239 Ike Ejiochi, How the NFL makes the most money of any pro sport, CNBC 
(Sept. 4, 2014, 9:32 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/04/how-the-nfl-makes-the 
-most-money-of-any-pro-sport.html [https://perma.cc/3WMC-KUJE]; see Taylor, 
supra note 28, at 2 (characterizing the NFL as “the global powerhouse in Amer-
ican football”); Kevin Seifert, How American Football Is Becoming a Worldwide 
Sport, ESPN (May 5, 2016), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/15273529/how 
-american-football-becoming-worldwide-sport-europe-china-beyond [https:// 
perma.cc/M7V2-UUJN] (chronicling the slow growth of the “uniquely Ameri-
can” version of football in foreign countries and conceding that “it will be a 
while—if ever—before international prospects feed the NFL talent pool on a 
regular basis”). 
240 Taylor, supra note 28, at 9. 
241 Id. 
242 For example, if one searches “September 2017” matches on the MLS 
Schedule website, most are on Saturdays or midweek, with only five played on 
Sundays. Schedule, MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER, http://www.mlssoccer.com/schedule 
[https://perma.cc/87GB-ENBL] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
243 Taylor, supra note 28, at 9. 
244 Id. at 2. 
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leagues in the world in their respective sports because the top 
players in the world come to the United States to play.245 American 
fans who attend MLB, NBA, and NHL matches are accustomed 
to seeing Japanese pitchers or Dominican sluggers in their prime 
or medalists from the most recent Olympics.246 
To see current World Cup champions in a given professional 
match, however, an American sports fan would have to do what the 
best players in the world do: go to Europe.247 Consider the profes-
sional clubs for players that made their national teams’ rosters 
for the most recent World Cup, which Brazil hosted in 2014.248 
With twenty-two players selected to make an international team, 
MLS tied for ninth with Portugal’s Primera Division.249 Contrast 
that with how many players the top five European leagues pro-
vided: EPL (105), Serie A (81), Bundesliga (73), La Liga (62), and 
Ligue 1 (47).250 Seven European teams provided over eleven play-
ers and thus could theoretically have fielded a team.251 Of the 
twenty-two MLS players to make an international roster, fifteen 
of those played for the USMNT, which filled the remainder of its 
slots with four players each from the EPL and Bundesliga and the 
rest from European or Mexican leagues.252 By contrast, the roster 
                                                                                                            
245 Id.; see Lenihan, supra note 28, at 909 (offering examples of the “finest 
players” in Japan’s top Nippon Professional Baseball league leaving for MLB). 
246 Taylor, supra note 28, at 21 (calling the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL “the 
top destinations for athletes in their sports” where “American fans are accus-
tomed to[ ] top athletes assembled in one place”); see Seifert, supra note 239 
(writing that “[i]nternational athletes now represent 20 percent of NBA play-
ers and 25 percent of Major League Baseball players”). 
247 Taylor, supra note 28, at 2 (writing that “Americans go abroad to get the 
best-rate soccer action”); see Decurtins, supra note 20, at 346–47 (contrasting 
the strict MLS rule limiting the number of foreign-born players with the more open 
European rules that mandate only a small number of players be homegrown). 
248 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil™, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/ar 
chive/brazil2014/ [https://perma.cc/47B2-X9KS] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
249 Which Leagues and Clubs Have the Most Players at the 2014 World Cup?, 
GOAL (June 5, 2014), http://www.goal.com/en/news/1717/editorial/2014/06/05 
/4861228/which-league-and-clubs-have-the-most-players-at-the-2014 [https:// 
perma.cc/RE4T-U4FF]. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Jack Bell, Countdown to 2014 World Cup Brazil: U.S. Soccer Team Un-
veils Preliminary World Cup Roster, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2014), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/sports/soccer/us-soccer-team-unveils-preliminary-world 
-cup-roster.html. 
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for eventual champion Germany contained only players from Eu-
rope’s top leagues: nineteen from the Bundesliga, four from the 
EPL, two from Serie A, one from La Liga, and none from MLS.253 
The runner-up Argentine National Team featured only three 
players from its home Argentine Primera Division; sixteen players 
on its twenty-three man roster were from Serie A, La Liga, EPL, 
or Ligue 1, while none were from MLS.254 
This difference in international talent is a simple issue of 
money: similar to the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL, the top European 
leagues pay huge salaries to acquire and retain the best players.255 
On a per-player basis, EPL teams Manchester City and Manchester 
United pay as much as the New York Yankees or NBA franchises—
despite the latter having rosters half the size as the soccer clubs.256 
Professional soccer prior to MLS failed in part because the North 
American Soccer League (NASL) in the 1970s and 1980s attempted 
to follow the European model by signing high-priced talent; with 
poor management and a lack of sufficient revenue, however, the 
league folded.257 To avoid that fate, MLS deliberately structured 
itself as a single entity so that the league and not individual 
teams contracted with players, and those contracts were limited 
by strict salary caps.258 At least initially, the lower overall talent 
                                                                                                            
253 Rob Goldberg, Germany World Cup Roster 2014: Full 26-Man Squad and 
Starting 11 Projections, BLEACHER REPORT (May 8, 2014), http://bleacherreport 
.com/articles/1976561-germany-world-cup-roster-2014-full-23-man-squad-and 
-starting-11-projections [https://perma.cc/U5FZ-HGP8]; see 2014 FIFA World 
Cup Brazil™, supra note 248 (listing the final match score as 1–0 in favor of 
Germany). 
254 Telegraph Sport, Argentina World Cup 2014 squad, TELEGRAPH (June 2, 
2014, 10:45 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/argentina 
/10810410/Argentina-World-Cup-2014-squad.html [https://perma.cc/85L5-MPRQ]; 
see 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil™, supra note 248 (showing the Argentine na-
tional team falling to the German squad in the final match 0–1 in extra time). 
255 SPORTING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 234, at 26–27, 32–39. 
256 Cork Gaines, The Cleveland Cavaliers top the list of the highest-paid 
sports teams in the world, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://www 
.businessinsider.com/highest-paid-sports-teams-2016-11/#20-golden-state-war 
riors-666-million-average-pay-per-player-1 [https://perma.cc/67PH-ESVC]. Real 
Madrid and Barcelona of La Liga have salaries in the Top 20 worldwide, and 
Paris Saint Germain of Ligue 1 are 35th after topping the list in 2015. Id. 
257 Coppage, supra note 20, at 548–49; Decurtins, supra note 20, at 332–33. 
258 Coppage, supra note 20, at 548, 558; Bezbatchenko, supra note 20, at 
623–24. 
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level in MLS was guided by the necessity of surviving by control-
ling costs.259 
As interest in MLS grew, it responded to criticism of offer-
ing a “dull product” by implementing the Designated Player rule.260 
This permitted individual teams a limited number of roster slots 
to pay players at a global market rate but have only a fraction of 
that salary count against the team’s cap.261 The most notable ex-
ample is David Beckham: the Los Angeles Galaxy hired the Man-
chester United and Real Madrid superstar for $250 million.262 
While MLS paid $400,000 of his salary, the team investor-operator 
covered the rest.263 Proponents argue that the rule benefits league 
marketing efforts because it can attract fans with international 
soccer’s biggest names, and it improves league quality by expos-
ing all players to talent from the top international clubs.264 Critics 
counter that the Designated Player rule hurts the quality of MLS: 
teams pay a high price for a handful of players who are past their 
prime, while the salary cap on young American talent forces home-
grown superstars to leave for European leagues in search of better 
pay.265 To be sure, MLS salaries are growing: the total payroll in-
creased 22 percent from 2015 to 2016.266 On a per-player basis, 
however, MLS averages $313,438 for starters, which is a third of 
the average for Ligue 1 ($961,638) and a tenth of the EPL 
($3,218,523).267 The combination of salary cap and Designated 
Player rule means that MLS talent is split between emerging 
youngsters and aging superstars while the cash-rich European teams 
                                                                                                            
259 Bezbatchenko, supra note 20, at 641–42. 
260 Id. at 639. 
261 Id. at 633; Lenihan, supra note 28, at 895, 898–900. 
262 Bezbatchenko, supra note 20, at 633–34; Coppage, supra note 20, at 549–50. 
263 Bezbatchenko, supra note 20, at 633–34. 
264 Id. at 634; Coppage, supra note 20, at 559. 
265 Coppage, supra note 20, at 559 (writing that the designated players “are 
in the latter stages of their careers”); Lenihan, supra note 28, at 908–09 (opin-
ing that MLS “los[es] young talent to the highest bidder”); Taylor, supra note 
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266 SPORTING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 234, at 44; see Coppage, supra note 
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Liga ($1,635,869), Serie A ($1,459,436), Bundesliga ($1,372,610). Id. at 32, 34, 36. 
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feature those players in their prime.268 This difference might be 
enough for a court to rule that the quality of the MLS soccer “product” 
precludes a comparison to the products offered by the top Euro-
pean leagues.269 
The difference in the age of the comparator leagues also 
challenges the reasonableness of applying Drut and Szymanski to 
MLS.270 The professional soccer leagues of England, France, Ger-
many, and Italy have each existed for over 100 years, with the 
first champions of England crowned in 1889,271 France in 1894,272 
Italy in 1898,273 and Germany in 1903.274 Granted, the leagues did 
not have competitions during the World Wars,275 and they may have 
existed in other forms.276 MLS, by contrast, is only two decades old 
and is still in a growth mode: MLS has seen its total attendance 
increase 40 percent in the ten years since 2006;277 MLS already 
                                                                                                            
268 Lenihan, supra note 28, at 908–09; see Decurtins, supra note 20, at 350 
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Americans have better financial prospects in foreign leagues). 
269 See Taylor, supra note 28, at 20 (“Fans [of MLS] want to see a quality product, 
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270 See text accompanying notes 271–79. 
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275 For example, French soccer halted with World War I, resumed in the late 
1920s and 1930s, paused again with World War II, but then has operated con-
tinuously since the late 1940s. See France>>Ligue 1>>Champions, supra note 
272; Football in France and the significance of World War 1, WORLDSOCCER 
(Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.worldsoccer.com/blogs/football-france-significance-world 
-war-1-358236 [https://perma.cc/P6SB-LGFN]. 
276 For example, the EPL technically dates from 1992, but it formed by split-
ting from the Football League, which was established over 125 years ago in 1888. 
History, PREMIER LEAGUE, http://www.premierleague.com/history [https://perma 
.cc/3A7M-MWXJ]; Phil Shaw, Establishing the Template, FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
(2013), http://www.fl125.co.uk/history/1888-1914 [https://perma.cc/WXV6-3GH2]. 
277 Jeff Carlisle, MLS sets average attendance record in 2016 as Seattle Sounders 
lead all clubs, ESPN (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.espn.com/soccer/major-league-soc 
cer/story/2980505/mls-sets-average-attendance-record-in-2016-as-seattle-sounders 
-lead-all-clubs?src=%E2%80%A6 [http://perma.cc/TF34-SSC4]; see Coppage, 
supra note 20, at 563 (characterizing the MLS levels of growth as “stunning”). 
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sees substantial year-over-year growth, such as in 2011 when its 
attendance surpassed the NBA and NHL because of a 7 percent 
increase and in 2015 when the league had a per-game average 
increase of 12.7 percent;278 and several teams with the highest 
attendance are expansion clubs.279 One might therefore question 
whether the World Cup would provide the spur for dramatic at-
tendance increases for a league that already sees sizeable annual 
growth and where expansion is the norm.280 
C.  Positive Factors Insufficient to Overcome Key Differences 
Something that militates toward reasonableness is that 
Drut and Szymanski included Japan and Korea—which co-hosted 
the 2002 World Cup—in their study.281 These nations have tier-one 
leagues comparable to MLS in age, with Japan’s forming in 1993 
and Korea’s in 1983,282 and soccer is not necessarily the top pro-
fessional sport in those countries.283 The problem is that Drut and 
Szymanski did not obtain data about these two countries from a 
public source,284 nor did they specify whether the World Cup 
bump in those two countries was comparable to that in the Euro-
pean countries.285 One therefore cannot determine if Japanese 
and Korean professional league attendance was greater or less 
than attendance following the five European World Cups.286 
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Takeo Hirata and the Korean data by Jai-Ku Sun and Byungju Kang). 
285 See generally id. 
286 See generally id. 
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Other differences between MLS and European leagues could 
enhance the potential for a World Cup bump.287 European leagues 
typically do not have postseason playoffs to determine league cham-
pions, although they do have brief playoff series to determine rel-
egation or promotion.288 For instance, at the end of the regular 
season, the sixteenth-ranked team in the Bundesliga has a two-game 
playoff with the third-ranked team in the German Second Divi-
sion (2. Bundesliga), with the winner competing in the Bundesliga 
next season and the loser relegated to the second division.289 MLS 
follows the example of other American sports leagues by having a 
postseason playoff to determine that season’s champion.290 The 
World Cup is itself a large playoff: the top thirty-two teams that 
qualify in their regionals play in groups, with top group performers 
advancing to single-elimination games until a champion is deter-
mined.291 If that format leads World Cup fans to watch profes-
sional soccer, then MLS should not suffer by offering a similar 
format.292 Another difference mentioned above was league sched-
ules: European leagues play fall to spring, while MLS plays spring to 
fall.293 The World Cup is typically in the summer—except for the 
controversial move to hold the 2022 World Cup Qatar in winter to 
avoid the dangerous desert heat294—so MLS could benefit by re-
suming its season within days of the close of the World Cup.295 
These positive factors may not be enough to support the 
assumption that MLS would see a World Cup Bump like European 
                                                                                                            
287 Id. at 7. 
288 Taylor, supra note 28, at 6–7. 
289 What is the relegation/promotion playoff?, BUNDESLIGA, http://www.bunde 
sliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/noblmd34-what-is-the-relegation-promotion-play-off 
.jsp [https://perma.cc/8JA7-CYMX]. 
290 Taylor, supra note 28, at 7. 
291 Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, at 251. 
292 Id. at 294. 
293 See Taylor, supra note 28, at 9. 
294 FIFA Executive Committee confirms November/December event period for 
Qatar 2022, FIFA.COM (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y 
=2015/m=3/news=fifa-executive-committee-confirms-november-december-event-pe 
riod-for-q-2567789.html [https://perma.cc/2EUZ-ADAJ]; Youd, supra note 4, at 
174–75. 
295 See Taylor, supra note 28, at 14 (arguing that MLS teams could “profit 
from additional ticket sales” following a World Cup because, unlike other American 
sport championships, the tournament does not mark the end of the season). 
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leagues by offsetting the significant differences in the U.S. and 
European markets and products.296 Yet the European-focused paper 
by Drut and Szymanski is the only extant study on the correlation 
between international competition and professional soccer atten-
dance,297 so any economic model of MLS attendance and damages 
related to the lost 2022 World Cup would necessarily have to rely 
upon it.298 Models based upon single studies are not necessarily 
flawed, but their results will be met with more suspicion.299 Further-
more, the Drut and Szymanski study has been published only as a 
working paper and thus has not been vetted by the normal schol-
arly refereeing system.300 Peer review is but one factor in a Daubert 
analysis so that experts may rely upon non-peer-reviewed stud-
ies,301 but the lack of an underlying study’s engagement by other 
scholars nevertheless invites criticism.302 Without additional data 
and research pertaining to MLS and American markets, MLS or 
the investor-operators would take a significant risk by pinning 
multi-year, multimillion-dollar litigation or arbitration on an eco-
nomic model with such obvious vulnerabilities.303 
                                                                                                            
296 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 28, at 18 (“In order to compete with the in-
stant accessibility of top European leagues, MLS is trying to improve the quality 
of its matches and find ways to distinguish their product from these leagues.”). 
297 Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 4. 
298 See generally JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS 
SECTION AND PANEL DATA (2d ed. 2010). 
299 See text accompanying notes 184–88 (describing court and commentator 
distrust of economic models based upon a single study). 
300 See supra note 22 (indicating that the paper is available on the Soccernomics 
website); Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 1 n.1 (including author contact 
information but no publication in a peer-reviewed journal). 
301 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); see id. (recog-
nizing that “in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not 
have been published”); see also Nilavar v. Osborn, 738 N.E.2d 1271, 1289 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2000) (permitting expert testimony where expert relied on work-life 
tables not subjected to peer review or widely accepted by the scientific commu-
nity but which had been published for at least nine years and were more con-
servative than a study that the opposing expert said was authoritative). 
302 D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit 
in Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1997 (2001) (crit-
icizing expert’s “resistance theory” because “[i]t has never been published or 
examined by other economists”). 
303 Joni Hersch & Blair Druhan Bullock, The Use and Misuse of Econometric 
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2365, 
2367–68 (2014). 
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V.  THE 2016 COPA AMERICA CENTENARIO: CONFIRMING AN 
MLS ATTENDANCE BUMP 
Drut and Szymanski not only found an attendance bump 
following five European World Cups, but also following four Euro 
Cups, the quadrennial European championship tournament for 
UEFA’s national teams.304 The Euro Cup is similar to the Copa 
America, which was hosted by the USSF in 2016.305 This Part ex-
amines MLS attendance before and after the Copa America and 
concludes that MLS saw an increase of 917 fans per game at-
tributable to the tournament.306 This finding not only supports 
the general result of Drut and Szymanski’s study, it also suggests 
that the Copa America bump is of a similar magnitude to the World 
Cup bump.307 Thus, our results argue for the reasonableness of 
the assumption that a 2022 World Cup USA would have resulted 
in increased MLS attendance comparable to European leagues 
but for the unlawful intervention in the bidding and subsequent 
awarding of the 2022 World Cup to Qatar.308 
A.  The Euro Cup and Copa America 
While few if any sporting events can match the global in-
terest in the World Cup, FIFA confederations nevertheless engage 
continents through similar tournaments every four years.309 For 
example, the UEFA Euro Cup started in 1960 with four teams, 
but the tournament field has expanded over the decades.310 The 
French Football Federation hosted the 2016 Euro Cup, which fea-
tured the twenty-four European national teams that had advanced 
from fifty-three teams participating in nine group qualifiers.311 
Like the World Cup, the tournament spanned about a month during 
                                                                                                            
304 Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 1–5; UEFA EURO 2016: France, 
supra note 30. 
305 Stejskal, supra note 31. 
306 Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 11. 
307 See infra text accompanying notes 371–73. 
308 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4 at 34–35. 
309 Letter from Jérôme Valcke, supra note 1. 
310 UEFA EURO 2016 Competition Format, UEFA, http://www.uefa.com/uefa 
euro/about-euro/format/index.html [https://perma.cc/XMP2-323P] (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2018). 
311 Id. 
 
2018] MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER 663 
June and July,312 and ten cities across the country hosted matches.313 
The teams first played in groups of four and then advanced to a 
knockout format,314 with the Portuguese national team defeating 
the host French squad 1–0 in the final.315 Total tournament at-
tendance was 2,427,303, with an average of over 47,000 specta-
tors per game.316 
The Copa America is the CONMEBOL equivalent of the 
Euro Cup and typically features the national teams of its ten South 
American member associations as well as two invited teams.317 
Because 2016 marked the centennial of the Copa America, 
CONMEBOL along with CONCACAF and the USSF planned a 
special one-off tournament, the Copa America Centenario, to be 
held in the United States.318 The field was expanded to sixteen 
teams, with the ten CONMEBOL national teams joined by the 
host United States, Mexico, and four qualifying teams from Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean.319 The tournament ran from 
June 3 through June 26.320 Of the ten venues, three were the 
homes of MLS teams (CenturyLink Field in Seattle, Camping 
World Stadium in Orlando, and Gillette Stadium in Foxborough); 
six the homes of NFL or major college teams while the MLS 
squads in that city have a different stadium (Levi’s Stadium in 
Santa Clara, the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, Soldier Field in Chicago, 
Lincoln Financial Field in Philadelphia, MetLife Stadium in East 
Rutherford, and NRG Stadium in Houston); and one an NFL sta-
dium in a city without an MLS team (University of Phoenix Sta-
dium in Glendale).321 The USMNT performed well, making it out 
of the group stage and finishing fourth in a 1–0 loss to Colombia 
                                                                                                            
312 Id. 
313 UEFA EURO 2016: France, supra note 30 (listing Bordeaux, Lens, Lille, 
Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, Saint-Etienne, Nice, Paris and Saint-Denis). 
314 UEFA EURO 2016 Competition Format, supra note 310. 
315 Matches, UEFA, http://www.uefa.com/uefaeuro/season=2016/matches/index 
.html#md/7 [https://perma.cc/E7MZ-XBVB] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
316 Chris Burke, UEFA Euro 2016 by numbers, UEFA (July 11, 2016), https://web 
.archive.org/web/20160712130233/http://www.uefa.com/uefaeuro/news/newsid 
=2390063.html [https://perma.cc/H5A5-2MNX]. 
317 Stejskal, supra note 31. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. 
321 Id. 
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in the third-place game.322 The Chilean team prevailed as tourna-
ment champions by beating Argentina on penalty kicks.323 The 
total attendance for the thirty-two games was nearly 1.5 million, 
which averaged over 46,000 and was thus equivalent to the 2016 
Euro Cup per-game average.324 
B.  Our Study 
Our purpose is to establish a legitimate basis from which 
to compare a potential World Cup bump in the United States to 
previous estimates provided by Drut and Szymanski.325 For liti-
gation purposes, their estimates are problematic based on the dis-
cussion in Part IV, supra; however, their study does provide a 
framework for analysis.326 The authors gathered attendance data 
from the approximate time of venue announcement up to the tour-
nament, and then they gathered attendance data for five years 
after the tournament.327 These data allowed Drut and Szymanski 
to test for an attendance effect of hosting the World Cup by com-
paring attendance in games around the tournament to the 
longer-term attendance average for each host nation.328 
The announcement that the Copa America Centenario 
would be played in the United States occurred on May 1, 2014.329 
                                                                                                            
322 Tom Dart, USA end Copa América with Colombia loss but show fight and 
flair in defeat, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2016, 10:19 PM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/football/2016/jun/25/usa-beaten-colombia-copa-america-centenario [https:// 
perma.cc/47E6-ZJBP]. 
323 Aaron Timms, Chile win Copa América once again as Argentina title drought 
continues, GUARDIAN (June 26, 2016, 11:34 PM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/football/2016/jun/26/chile-win-copa-america-argentina-match-report-penalty  
-shoot-out [https://perma.cc/2HCN-JTNG]. 
324 Sergei Klebnikov, Successful Copa America 2016 Smashes Records, FORBES 
(June 26, 2016, 4:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2016/06 
/26/successful-copa-america-2016-smashes-records/#4330b5f3734b. 
325 Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 2, 6–7. 
326 Hersch & Bullock, supra note 303, at 2367–68. 
327 Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 5, 11. 
328 Id. at 5–11. 
329 E.g., Jeff Carlisle, U.S. to host Copa America, ESPNFC (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.espnfc.us/copa-america/story/1803812/united-states-to-host-combined 
-2016-copa-america-centenario [https://perma.cc/HW4T-CK7F]; Andrew Das, 
U.S. Will Host Expanded Copa América in 2016, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2014), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/sports/soccer/us-will-host-expanded-copa-america 
-in-2016.html?_r=0. 
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The first game of the Copa was played on June 3, 2016,330 and our 
article was written in the winter of 2017.331 Based on the Drut 
and Szymanski framework, the sample of games that might be 
influenced by a Copa bump consists of 932 MLS regular-season 
games: 731 games played between May 2, 2014 and June 2, 2016 
and 201 played between June 3, 2016 and the end of the 2016 
regular season.332 In a manner similar to Drut and Szymanski, we 
can compare attendance in games pre- and post-Copa to that in 
other MLS games.333 
C.  Data and Analysis 
Our data set contains information on attendance from every 
regular-season game from the start of the 2007 season to the end 
of the 2016 regular season.334 This time period is chosen because 
it is the “designated player era” of MLS335 and represents a period 
in MLS’s history in which average player salaries were increasing 
dramatically336 as was the number of high-quality players.337 We 
delete home games for a team that no longer exists, Chivas USA, 
                                                                                                            
330 Stejskal, supra note 31. 
331 See generally Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 2367–68. 
332 Major League Soccer Scores, ESPNFC, http://www.espnfc.us/major-league 
-soccer/19/scores [https://perma.cc/RL5U-HFB7] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (re-
porting scores and statistics for each MLS game; statistics noted in the sen-
tence came from compiling and counting the number of games played each day 
in the noted range). 
333 See generally id. 
334 The data was collected from the ESPN FC website by one of the authors 
as well as a student assistant. See generally id. 
335 Dennis Coates, Bernd Frick & Todd Jewell, Superstar Salaries and Soccer 
Success: The Impact of Designated Players in Major League Soccer, 17 J. SPORTS 
ECON. 716, 720 (2016) (writing that “MLS established the DP rule in 2007”). 
336 E.g., Todd Jewell, Major League Soccer in the USA, in HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL 351, 360, 360 n.7 (John Goddard & 
Peter Sloane eds., 2014) (referencing data from the MLS players’ website and 
an average team wage bill that increased from $2 million to $2.9 million from 
2006 to 2007). 
337 R. Todd Jewell, The Effect of Marquee Players on Sports Demand: The 
Case of US Major League Soccer, 18 J. SPORTS ECON. 239, 240–41 (2017) [here-
inafter Jewell, Marquee Players] (“MLS’s DP rule is essentially an exemption 
to the salary cap. The rule allows teams to sign players of higher quality than 
would be possible under a hard cap, effectively expanding the pool of potential 
players and increasing the quality of the league overall.”). 
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which folded after the 2014 season.338 The resulting data com-
prise 2,697 regular season games.339 Our goal is twofold: first, we 
want to predict attendance growth in MLS net of any potential 
Copa America bump; and second, we want to test for the existence 
of a Copa America bump. In order to identify the time pattern of 
MLS attendance, it is necessary to eliminate the influence of other 
factors that are related to attendance.340 Based on past research, 
we can identify several factors that influence attendance demand 
in MLS.341 For instance, we expect that the month342 and day of 
the game343 will influence attendance.344 Based on our 2007 to 
2016 MLS sample, attendance is highest at the beginning of the 
season, falls through the next few months, and rises again at the 
end of the season.345 This monthly pattern of attendance is likely 
due to the excitement of the start of the season, the drop in excite-
ment that comes with mid-season games, and anticipation of 
playoff soccer as the season comes to a close. Games played on the 
weekend have higher attendances than those played Monday 
through Friday due to increased demand.346 
As discussed above, MLS operates in an ultracompetitive 
market for sports entertainment.347 Thus, the local market for 
sports entertainment is an important factor in determining MLS 
attendance.348 Studies on demand in sports have generally tried 
                                                                                                            
338 Jeff Carlisle, Chivas USA to suspend operations after 2014 MLS season, 
sources say, ESPNFC (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.espnfc.com/major-league-soc 
cer/story/2061689/chivas-usa-to-suspend-operations-after-mls-seasonsources-say 
[https://perma.cc/LTG6-LZX8]. 
339 Major League Soccer Scores, supra note 332. 
340 See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 298, at 3 (referencing the need to hold other 
factors constant when determining whether a change in one variable causes a 
change in another variable). 
341 Jewell, Marquee Players, supra note 337, at 241 (referencing factors that 
influence MLS attendance demand). 
342 Id. at 243. 
343 Id. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. at 244. 
346 Id. at 247 (writing that “attendance is 12 [percent] lower on weekdays 
than on weekends”). 
347 See Section IV.B supra. 
348 R. Todd Jewell & David J. Molina, An Evaluation of the Relationship 
between Hispanics and Major League Soccer, 6 J. SPORTS ECON. 160, 161, 164 
(2005) (referencing market potential as a determinant of MLS attendance and 
other sport entertainment options as a factor in market potential). 
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two strategies in adjusting for factors related to the local sports 
entertainment market.349 First, studies have used measures of 
market size (e.g., population and income) and market saturation 
(e.g., number and types of entertainment competition) to capture 
the effect of the sports entertainment market.350 For data like the 
MLS attendance sample in which there are repeated observations 
on individual units over time (referred to as panel data), the re-
searcher has another option.351 With panel data, the researcher 
often chooses a second strategy of fixed- or random-effects estima-
tion.352 This second strategy identifies a single coefficient for each 
unit (in our case, each MLS club) that encompasses the combined 
effects of all factors related to the MLS club that are not directly 
controlled for using other independent variables.353 
In our estimation, we chose the strategy of a fixed-effect 
estimation.354 Thus, we estimate a club-specific effect that con-
trols for the effect of competition from other sports entertainment, 
potential fan base, and anything else that might influence atten-
dance in a given city that is not directly measured by another in-
dependent variable.355 We also used a fixed-effect approach to 
control for differences in attendance that may be due to other fac-
tors, like the visiting team, team quality, and star-power of play-
ers.356 After adjusting for other factors such as weekday effects, 
                                                                                                            
349 Id. at 166–67. 
350 Id. at 167–68 (using population per square mile and per capita income 
in the local metropolitan statistical area (MSA) to indicate market size, and using 
the existence of other professional sports teams in the MSA to indicate market 
saturation). 
351 PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 281–88 (6th ed. 2008) (dis-
cussing panel data). 
352 Id. at 282–86 (discussing fixed-effects and random-effects models, the 
advantages of each, and the appropriate use of each). 
353 Id. at 281–82 (discussing the use of panel data to control for “a myriad 
of unmeasured explanatory variables that affect the behavior of people” which 
would otherwise cause estimation bias); id. at 283 (referencing ways to control 
for the bias associated with unmeasured variables by “modeling the presence 
of a different intercept” for each observational unit). 
354 See supra text accompanying note 352. 
355 See KENNEDY, supra note 351, at 293 (providing mathematical details on 
estimating fixed-effects models). 
356 See, e.g., Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 7 (claiming that individual 
club attendance is “highly dependent on team performance in” league games); 
Jewell, Marquee Players, supra note 337, at 241 (finding a correlation between 
superstars and attendance). 
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month effects, home-team effects, and away-team effects, the time 
pattern of MLS attendance can be predicted as a linear time-trend, 
where the magnitude of the time-trend results from an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression incorporating the controls for other 
factors.357 The estimated Copa America bump (pre and post) is the 
average deviation from the predicted linear-attendance trend for 
the 932 games that might be influenced by the Copa.358 
The resulting forecast equation for MLS attendance at reg-
ular-season games is the following: Attendance = (270 × Year) + 
(917 × Copa Game) + weekday effects + month effects + home-team 
effects + away-team effects.359 The variable Year indicates the sea-
son, from 2007 to 2016, and the variable Copa Game equals 1 if 
the game occurred in the pre- or post-Copa-America period.360 
This equation implies that, on average and controlling for the ef-
fects of season, day, month, home-team, and away-team, MLS 
regular-season attendance increased by 270 fans per game each 
year from 2007 to 2016.361 This 1.4 percent annual increase is con-
sistent with the general observation that MLS is a growing league 
in terms of game-day attendance.362 
Most relevant for the current study, the equation suggests 
that the 932 games pre- and post-Copa-America had, on average, 917 
more fans than other games in the sample, controlling for other 
factors that determine demand for MLS game-day attendance.363 
                                                                                                            
357 Multiple regression analysis is a means of analyzing voluminous data by 
incorporating several variables into a single formula, and OLS is a common 
type of multiple regression. Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 37–38. When 
the estimation is linear in nature, OLS has “a large number of desirable prop-
erties.” Id. at 38 (quoting KENNEDY, supra note 351, at 43). 
358 See KENNEDY, supra note 351, at 293. 
359 The authors also attempted estimates separating the sample into MLS 
cities that did and did not host Copa America games, but found no significant dif-
ference across host and non-host cities in the Copa bump. The impact of the Copa 
America appears to be consistent on attendance across the entire league rather 
than varying across host and non-host cities as found by Drut and Szymanski. 
Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 8. 
360 See supra text accompanying note 33. 
361 See supra text accompanying notes 341–45, 355–60. 
362 Based on a sample average of 18,960 fans per game, an increase of 270 
fans per game represents a 1.4 percent change per year. See supra text accom-
panying notes 277–79; see also Stephanie Andale, Average?Definition?How to 
Calculate Average, STATISTICS HOW TO (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.statistics 
howto.com/average [https://perma.cc/AUK2-GBNX]. 
363 See supra text accompanying notes 359–60. 
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Although the Copa America bump is smaller than that found by 
Drut and Szymanski, it is significant in both a statistical and an 
economic sense.364 In the statistical sense, the results show that 
the t-statistic365 for the coefficient on Copa Game is 2.87, signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level.366 “Economic significance” refers to the 
absolute magnitude of the implied causal relationship367—in this 
case, the size of any impact that the Copa America had on overall 
attendance (and more importantly revenue) in MLS.368 In per-
centage terms, 917 fans per game is an increase of 4.8 percent 
over the sample average of 18,960 fans per game.369 As compared 
to the estimated yearly growth of 1.4 percent discussed above, the 
Copa America bump is nearly three times as large.370 Overall, the 
Copa America bump from May 1, 2014 to the end of the 2016 reg-
ular season is estimated to be 854,644 fans.371 In monetary terms, 
if fans spend an average of $73,372 then the Copa America bump 
is over $63 million in revenue.373 If, as reported in Forbes, MLS 
generated $461 million in revenue in 2014, a Copa America bump 
of $63 million represents a substantial increase in overall league 
revenues.374 And, if the results of Drut and Szymanski with respect 
                                                                                                            
364 See Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 20. 
365 David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 299 (3d 
ed. 2011) (defining “t-statistic” as a statistical test that “indicates how far away 
an estimate is from its expected value, relative to the standard error”); id. at 
300 (writing that, if the t-statistic is large, then the results of the results are 
“beyond the usual range of sampling error”). 
366 See id. at 300 (writing that a t-statistic “bigger than 2 or smaller than -2” 
has a significance of 5 percent, which is “hard to explain on the basis of sam-
pling error”). 
367 See Stephen T. Ziliak & Deirdre N. McCloskey, Size Matters: The Stan-
dard Error of Regressions in the American Economic Review, 33 J. SOCIO-ECONS. 
527, 528 (2004) (discussing the difference between statistical significance and eco-
nomic significance and concluding that “fit is not the same thing as scientific 
importance; a merely statistical significance cannot substitute for the judgment of 
a scientist and her community about the largeness or smallness of a coefficient”). 
368 See infra text accompanying notes 371–74. 
369 917 divided by the sample average of 18,960 fans per game equals 0.048, 
or 4.8 percent. See Andale, supra note 362. 
370 See supra text accompanying note 362. 
371 See supra text accompanying note 359. 
372 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 39. 
373 See supra text accompanying notes 371–72. 
374 See Smith, Most Valuable MLS Teams, supra note 137. 
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to a continued bump in attendance over a five-year period hold in 
the case of Copa America Centenario, this bump will continue for 
at least three more years.375 
CONCLUSION 
Finding a Copa America bump in MLS attendance sup-
ports the conclusion by Drut and Szymanski of a tier-one soccer 
league attendance increase associated with international tourna-
ments.376 It also supports Commissioner Garber’s assertion that 
the United States is becoming a soccer nation:377 American soccer 
fans increased their attendance at MLS games in response to an 
international tournament hosted in the United States just as Eu-
ropean soccer fans increased their attendance at European pro-
fessional league games in response to international tournaments 
hosted in their nations.378 Of more immediate relevance to legal 
actions contemplated by MLS and its investor-operators, the Copa 
America bump bolsters the assumption that MLS would have seen 
a World Cup bump comparable to that of the European leagues 
despite the differences in the American and European leagues and 
markets.379 While complex transnational dispute resolution is 
never certain, these results suggest that a tribunal would not reject 
a damages model if MLS or its investor-operators were to initiate 
litigation or arbitration for lost profits and diminution of business 
value caused by corruption in the 2022 World Cup bidding.380 
Our findings of a Copa America bump are not limited to 
MLS legal actions.381 For example, expert testimony supported by 
                                                                                                            
375 See Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 2. 
376 See id. 
377 Major League Soccer Attendance Is Up, but TV Ratings Lag as U.S. Soccer 
Mulls Future, USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2017, 8:50 PM), https://www.usatoday 
.com/story/sports/mls/2017/11/17/mls-attendance-up-tv-ratings-lag-as-us-mulls 
-future/107770250/ [https://perma.cc/2YC4-K4C8]; Aaron Cranford, Don Garber 
insists MLS will be one of world’s best leagues in 10 years or less, SBI (Sep. 9, 
2015, 7:50 PM), http://sbisoccer.com/2015/09/insists-worlds-leagues [https://perma 
.cc/A33W-ERHR]. 
378 See supra text accompanying notes 361–75; Drut & Szymanski, supra 
note 22, at 2. 
379 See supra text accompanying notes 114–30. 
380 See supra text accompanying notes 121–30. 
381 See supra text accompanying notes 204–12. 
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economic models is used for a range of litigation purposes like val-
uation, class certification, and proving discrimination.382 A number 
of recent articles have examined the assumptions underlying those 
models, concluding that opposing counsel are more likely to attack 
a model’s assumptions rather than its methods and that some courts 
engage in careful analysis of economic models.383 This Article sug-
gests that imperfect comparisons—such as between different 
markets and different products—are sometimes acceptable and 
thus need not necessarily result in exclusion of the expert’s testi-
mony.384 Additional research on assumptions—particularly inter-
disciplinary research and analyses of data—could help courts and 
practitioners better understand economic models.385 
More economic studies of attendance are also warranted. 
For example, Drut and Szymanski do not distinguish the atten-
dance bump associated with the World Cup versus the Euro Cup, 
so one study might focus only on regional tournaments and the 
extent, if any, the attendance increase differs from the World Cup.386 
Also, the most recent World Cups were held outside of Europe: 
South Africa hosted in 2010 and Brazil in 2014.387 Research on 
tier-one attendance in those nations could show the extent to which 
the international tournament bump applies outside of OECD 
member countries and is thus generalizable.388 
Finally, the Copa America bump is preliminary because 
our Article does not measure the five-year bump period identified 
by Drut and Szymanski.389 A study of attendance data from the 
                                                                                                            
382 E.g., Anthony J. Casey & Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex 
Valuation, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2015); Hersch & Bullock, supra note 
303, at 2368; Todd & Jewell, Dubious, supra note 29, at 49. 
383 E.g., Allensworth, supra note 32, at 865 (writing that “many [trial courts] 
engage in thoughtful, detailed analysis of modeling choices”); Hill et al., supra 
note 29, at 331 n.253 (“Assumptions that form the inputs to valuation models are 
the most likely aspect of a damages expert’s report and testimony that opposing 
counsel will attack.”); Todd & Jewell, Dubious, supra note 29, passim (explicating 
cases to identify the types of assumptions that trial courts find problematic). 
384 See supra Part III. 
385 See supra Part III. 
386 See Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 20. 
387 Todd & Jewell, Reclaiming, supra note 3, at 255–56. 
388 See List of OECD Member Countries—Ratification of the Convention on 
the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-mem 
ber-countries.htm [https://perma.cc/WU35-HPTL]. 
389 See Drut & Szymanski, supra note 22, at 11. 
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2017, 2018, and 2019 MLS seasons will better show the extent to 
which MLS attendance compares to the European leagues.390 Such a 
study would not be too late to help MLS and its investor-operators 
because their claims are “not even ripe until 2022.”391 The results 
of additional economic research will help determine whether a 
tortious interference or unfair competition claim is warranted—
and, if so, the extent of the damages.392 
                                                                                                            
390 See supra text accompanying notes 340–45. 
391 Todd & Jewell, MLS, supra note 4, at 58. 
392 See supra Part II. 
